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THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE VIEW FROM
WITHOUT AND WITHIN
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
The "political trials" of the past decade generated a storm of legal
controversy over the conduct of the defendants and their attorneys-and
of the judges who presided at their trials. For some, the actions and
attitudes of both lawyers and defendants courted disrespectfor and presaged a breakdown in the law and its processes; for others, however, it
was the response of the judges-chiefly, their heavy-handed wielding of
the summary contempt power--that presented the real danger.
Professor Sedler brings a unique expertise to his discussion of the
use-and abuse--of summary contempt. While his approach reflects the
concerns of the scholar, it also bears the impressions of one who pressed
his arguments before the Supreme Court in its most recent review of the
summary contempt power. His perspective thus represents a confluence of
the interests of both the academic and the advocate, pulling into focus
the disparate elements and inherent unreasonableness of the summary
contempt power.

INTRODUCTION

The power of a judge to proceed summarily in punishing criminal contempt, a "crime in the ordinary sense,"' is clearly "an
anomaly in the law." 2 Only in a summary contempt proceeding are
the otherwise inconsistent functions of judge, jury and prosecutor
combined in a single individual-necessarily involved in the events
leading up to the charge-who "may proceed upon [his] own
knowledge of the facts, and punish the offender, without further
proof, and without issue or trial in any form." 3 Although the Supreme Court has "long recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the summary power to imprison for contempt," 4 it has never
held that the mere exercise of that power violates due process of
law. The Court has attempted to minimize judicial abuses, bow* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
' Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
2 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
3Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309 (1888).
4 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968), citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,
313 (1888).
34
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ever, by limiting the situations in which the summary power can
be invoked. Mr. Justice Rehnquist may have been overstating
when he recently maintained that the reforms have "virtually
emasculate[d] this historic power of a trial judge,".5 but the summary contempt power is doubtless not the formidable weapon that
it once was.
In this Article, I will discuss the evolution of constitutional
limitations on the exercise of the summary contempt power and
analyze the Supreme Court's most recent contribution to that process in Taylor v. Hayes.6 As the title indicates, the discussion wvill
proceed from "without and within"-from the dual perspectives of
an academician and of a part-time "movement lawyer ' 7 who, as
counsel for the petitioner in Taylor v. Hayes, developed a decided
opinion of the summary contempt power. I have approached legal
questions in this manner previously 8 and believe that such a
method has much to commend it. To the extent that the impartial
and dispassionate perspective of the pure legal scholar is a virtue,
its absence will be missed by the reader. On the other hand,
perhaps there is an existential as well as an objective component to
legal scholarship, and participation and involvement might thus
yield insights that detached observation could not supply. In any
event, it is important at the outset to state the perspective from
which-and the bias with which-I approach the question of the
summary contempt power and the Constitution.
I will begin by discussing the development of the summary
contempt power and the rationale that has been advanced to justify
it. I will then discuss the limitations that the Supreme Court
placed on its exercise prior to Taylor v. Hayes and go on to consider the viability of these limitations in the context of "political
trials," in which problems of disorder are most likely to arise. I will
next analyze Taylor v. Hayes "from within" and evaluate present
limitations on the exercise of the summary contempt power. In
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
6 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (decided the same day as Codispoti v. Pennsylvania. 418
5

U.S. 506 (1974)).
7 There are many varieties of such lawyers. Some are full-time employees of
"'movement" or civil rights organizations. A large number are lawyers engaged in
private practice who devote considerable time, generally without compensation, to
taking such cases. And some, like the present writer, are law professors who venture
forth from the groves of academe.
8 See Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and
Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1; Sedler, The Domnbrowski-Tjpc Suit as an Effectire
Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Witin (pts. 1-2), 18 K%.N.
L. REv. 237, 629 (1970); Sedler, The Procedural Defense in Sclectire Sertice Prosecutions: The View from Without and Within, 56 IOWA L. REv. 1121 (1971). Ste also
Sedler, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 1070 (1971) [hereinafter Sedler, Book Review].
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conclusion, I will argue that the exercise of the summary contempt
power ought to be prohibited, not only because the power itself is
unnecessary, but because its exercise violates due process of law.
II
THE

DEVELOPMENT AND RATIONALE OF THE
SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER

Courts are said to possess "inherent" power to punish for
contempt, 9 for the exercise of the contempt power is deeply in-

grained in English law. ' 0 Originally the power was not exercised in
a summary manner unless the contempt was committed "in the
face of the court," 1 but such contempts were punished quickly and
sometimes severely. 12 The existence of the contempt power and
the right of a court to exercise it summarily were part of the
English common law received in this country' 3 and were justified
14
by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Terry:
We have seen that it is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both
of England and of this country, never supposed to be in conflict with
the liberty of the citizen, that for direct contempts committed in the
face of the court .. the offender may, in [the court's] discretion, be
instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or

issue, and without other proof than [the court's] actual knowledge of
what occurred; and that . . . such power, although arbitrary in its
nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely essential to the protection of
the courts in the discharge of their functions. Without it, judicial
tribunals would be at the mercy of the disorderly and violent, who
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence Is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the ...
due administration of justice. The moment that courts of the United States
were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they
became possessed of this power....
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). However, the contempt power
is unknown to civil law systems. See R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1-2
(1963).
10 For a general discussion of the history of the contempt power, see J.Fox, THE
9

HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927).
11See GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 15-16.
12 For the view that even in-court contempts were tried by a jury until the reign
of Elizabeth I, see Solly-Flood, Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief Justice
Gasceign, 3 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y (n.s.) 47 (1886). Fox, however, takes
the position that, from the reign of Edward I, the courts had the power to punish
such contempts summarily. Fox, supra note 10, at 50-55. For a particularly outrageous contempt, e.g., throwing a brick-bat at the judge, the death penalty could be
imposed summarily. GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 15.
13 See note 9 supra.
14 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
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respect neither the laws enacted for the vindication of public and
private rights, nor the officers charged with the duty of administering
them. To say . . . that [an] offender was accused, tried, adjudged to
be guilty and imprisoned, without previous notice of the accusation
against him and without an opportunity to be heard, is nothing more
than an argument or protest against investing any court, however exalted, or however extensive its general jurisdiction, with the power of
proceeding summarily, without further proof or trial, for direct contempts committed in its presence.1 5
That the contemptuous acts in Temj occurred in the presence
of the court was given as further justification for allowing the
judge to punish the offender without notice or hearing, but this
extraordinary procedure was sanctioned in the first instance only
because it was necessary to "preserve order" and vindicate the dignity of an affronted court.16
At the same time, it was wellsettled in this country that the
judge could not proceed summarily with respect to out-of-court
contempts. 1 7 In Cooke v. United States, 18 for example, an attorney
delivered a letter to a federal district judge who had presided over
a case that the attorney had lost on the previous day. The letter
requested the judge to recuse himself in four other cases that the
attorney was scheduled to try before him, and it went on to criticize the previous conduct of the judge in "severe language, personally derogatory to the judge." 19 Some days later the judge entered
an order finding the attorney guilty of contempt and issued an attachment for his arrest. When the attorney was brought before the
judge and admitted sending the letter, the judge sentenced him for
contempt without allowing him to present any defense. On cer15 Id. at 313-14; cf. In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889). In Terryj the defendant
assaulted a marshal who tried to remove Terry's wife from the courtroom after the
court had found her guilty of "misbehavior' and ordered her removal. For a discussion of the case from the perspective of the "frontier tradition," see SPECIAL COM..

ON COURTROOM CONDUCT OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITy OF NE%" YORK,
DISORDER IN THE COURT 39-41 (1973) [hereinafter DISORDER L THE COURT].
1

6 See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925). The Cooke Court stated:

To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business.
the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical
obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is
no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the
court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court's dignity
and authority is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common
law and the punishment imposed is due process of law....
Id. at 524.
17 This was contrary to the English practice, which authorized summary procedure to punish such contempts. See Fox, supra note 10, at 5-33.
is 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
19 Id.
at 533-34.
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tiorari, the Supreme Court held that the requirements of due process precluded the judge from proceeding summarily when the
contempt charged was not committed in open court. Under such
circumstances the Court could find no justification for refusing to
advise the accused of the charges against him or for failing to provide him an opportunity to present and argue defenses. 2 0 The accused was given both the right to call witnesses to testify on his
behalf at the required hearing and the benefit of counsel upon
request. 21
The Court also held that the judge should recuse himself in
the subsequent contempt hearing because "the issue between the
judge and the parties had come to involve marked personal feeling
that did not make for an impartial and calm judicial consideration
and conclusion."-22 Significantly, however, the suggestion that a
judge personally embroiled in the controversy disqualify himself
those cases in
from hearing the contempt charges was limited to
23
appropriate.
not
was
proceeding
which a summary
The different procedures applicable to in-court contempts and
out-of-court contempts in federal proceedings are now embodied in
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 42(a) authorizes the judge to punish the contempt summarily if he "certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court," and
in such a case the rule requires the judge to enter an order of
contempt reciting the facts for review by the appellate court. Outof-court contempts must be dealt with under rule 42(b), which requires that the accused be given notice of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and be afforded a hearing before the
24
court (or before a jury if the defendant is entitled to a jury trial).
If the contempt charged involves "disrespect to or criticism of a
at the trial or hearjudge, that judge is disqualified from presiding
25
ing except with the defendant's consent."
Id. at 536.
at 537.
1d. at 539.
23 Id. The Court felt that self-disqualification was appropriate only "where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public
right." Id.
24 The conditions under which the right to a jury trial of contempt charges obtains are discussed in the text accompanying notes 93-119 infra.
25 FED. R. CifM. P. 42(b). The current federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1970), authorizes the federal courts to punish three categories of contempt
-misbehavior in the presence of the court or so nearby as to obstruct justice; misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions; and disobedience of or resistance to a court's lawful writ, process, order or decree. The same categories were set
20

21 Id.
22
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In In re Oliver,26 the Supreme Court held that due process
would be violated by the exercise of the summary contempt power
when the contempt was not committed in open court, even though
it may have been committed in the presence of the judge. In that
case a circuit judge, functioning as a "one-man grand jury" under
Michigan law, 27 summarily punished a witness believed to have
committed perjury during the "grand jury proceedings." The state
argued that, under Terry, the judge was entitled to proceed summarily because the conduct was committed in his presence. In rejecting this contention, the Court noted that since the conduct of
the accused occurred in secret, there could be no possibility of a
"demoralization of the court's authority" if it were not punished
summarily and that the judge's conclusions were based partly upon
additional testimony given in the absence of the accused. 28 The
main thrust of the decision, however, was that a judge could
proceed summarily only if the contempt was committed in open
court, for only then would the preserving order rationale justify a
summary proceeding "as a narrow exception to due process
2 9
requirements."
In Sacher v. United States,30 decided in 1952, the power to
punish in-court contempts summarily may be said to have reached
its zenith. Sacher arose out of the Smith Act conspiracy trial of the
leaders of the Communist Party3 ' during which there was "constant
' 32
contention between the lawyer, defendants, and the trial judge."
The judge had not punished contempts when they occurred but
waited until the end of the trial, when he proceeded summarily
under rule 42(a) and found the defendants' lawyers guilty of
numerous counts of criminal contempt. 3 3 The Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari was limited to the narrow question of whether
forth in an 1831 statute, Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 94, § 1, 4 Stat. 487, which was de-

signed to limit the broad grant of the contempt power contained in the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73. The scope of such statutes is to be narrowly interpreted. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1941).
27 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Id.at 261-63.
2
8 Id. at 277, quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
29 Id. at 275.
30 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
31
See Dennis v. United States , 341 U.S. 494, 495-98 (1951).
32

DIsORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 49. For examples of the conduct

involved, see id. at 50-54; Appendix to Opinion of Justice Frankfurter, Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 42-89 (1952).
3 However, after sentencing, the judge did give the accused the opportunity to

speak, and as the Supreme Court subsequently observed: -(He] would... no doubt
have modified his action had their statements proved persuasive." Groppi v. Leslie,
404 U.S. 496, 506 n.11 (1972).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:34

the judge could proceed summarily under rule 42(a) at the end of a
trial, 3 4 but the impact of the decision went far beyond that question. A divided Court held that the trial judge could proceed summarily at that time and that the judge was not disqualified from
sitting in judgment even though the contempts were "personal to
35
him. "
The Sacher majority held that "summary," as used in rule
42(a), did not refer to the timing of the judge's action, but to the
method of its exercise. The rule was thus thought to contemplate a
procedure dispensing with the "formality, delay and digression" 30
that would result from issuing process and holding a conventional
trial on the contempt charges. Noting that the rule only allowed
summary procedure with respect to conduct in the judge's presence, the Court asserted that "[r]easons for permitting straightway
exercise of the summary power are not reasons for compelling or
encouraging its immediate exercise." 37 In particular, the Court
pointed out that finding an attorney guilty of contempt during the
course of a trial could prejudice his client before the jury or otherwise interfere with the continuation of the trial. Emphasizing that
counsel were repeatedly warned during the course of the trial that
their conduct was regarded as contemptuous, the majority concluded:
If we were to hold that summary punishment can be imposed only
instantly upon the event, it would be an incentive to pronounce,
while smarting under the irritation of the contemptuous act, what
should be a well-considered judgment. We think it less likely that
unfair condemnation of counsel will occur if the more deliberate
course be permitted.
We hold that Rule 42 allows the trial judge, upon the occurrence
in his presence of a contempt, immediately and summarily to punish
it, if, in his opinion, delay will prejudice the trial. We hold, on the
other hand, that if he believes the exigencies of the trial require that
he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his power.38
Despite the fact that the trial judge had charged the attorneys
with deliberately entering into an agreement to harass him in the
hopes of impairing his health, 3 9 the Court held that the judge was
34 343 U.S. at 5.
35
Id. at 11-12.
36 Id. at 9.
37 Id. at 9-10.
38

Id. at 11.

The conviction on this count had been reversed by the Second Circuit,
since the alleged conspiracy did not occur in the judge's presence. Id.
39 Id.
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not disqualified. Taking an expansive view of the exercise of summary power, the Court felt it "almost inevitable" that any contempt
would offend a judge's personal dignity, and thus refused to limit

summary punishment to "such minor contempts as [would] leave

the judge indifferent." 40 The clear impact of this aspect of the Sacher holding was that a judge's possible bias stemming from the
personal nature of the contemptuous conduct would not operate to
prevent him from proceeding summarily under rule 42(a), even
after the trial, so long as that conduct occurred in open court. Yet
this same possibility of bias would be sufficient to require a judge's
recusal if the conduct did not occur in his presence.
The Sacher Court came down strongly in favor of the exercise
of the summary contempt power because it considered that power
crucial to preserving order in the courtroom. 41 Conceding that

summary punishment should always be "regarded with disfavor,"
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, stated that "the very prac-

tical [interests in courtroom order] which have led every system of
law to vest a contempt power in one who presides over judicial
proceedings also are the reasons which account for its being made
summary." 4 With respect to in-court contempts, then, the Sacher

Court held that a judge could proceed summarily either at the time

the contempt was committed or after the trial4 3 and indicated that
when acting summarily a judge would not be required to recuse
himself, even though the contempt may have been personal to
him. Moreover, since the right to trial by jury usually did not
40 Id. at 12.
41 The Supreme Court's emphatic endorsement of the summary contempt power
was by no means unanimous. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that (1) the

judge could not impartially sit in judgment on the charges, (2) the defendants were
entitled to a jury trial and (3) the defendants had not been given a chance to defend
themselves at all. Id. at 14-23. Justice Black also emphasized that the -[c]onviction
without trial" made it impossible for the appellate court to properly review the convictions. Id. at 18. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that since the judge
waited until the end of the trial to act, the possible bias on his part due to the
"personal" nature of the contempts should have required his recusal. Id. at 23-42.
Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that trial should have been before another
judge and that the defendants were entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 89.
42 Id. at 8. But see GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 1-2.
4 In practice judges seem to wait until after trial to punish contempts by
lawyers, thus avoiding any prejudice to a defendant that might result from his
lawyer's contempt conviction. Just a few years after Sacher, the Ninth Circuit observed: "It is now well established practice for the trial judge to reserve punishment
of contempts by participants in a criminal trial." Yates v. United States, '227 F.2d
851, 853 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd in part, 355 U.S. 66 (1957). Concerning the problems
that may arise when the judge proceeds summarily during the trial. see People v.
Fusaro, 18 Cal. App. 3d 877, 888-91, 96 Cal. Rptr. 368. 375-77 (1971). Cf. Hawk v.
Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974), cert. dcnied, 421 U.S.
1012 (1975).
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apply to criminal contempts at that time, judges were not required
to convene juries to impose punishment for serious contempts.44
Thus, the amount of punishment that the trial judge could impose
45
without a hearing of any kind was simply unlimited.
III
THE EROSION OF THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER:
FROM SACHER TO TAYLOR

Dissenting in Taylor v. Hayes and Codospoti v. Pennsylvania,4 6
Justice Rehnquist observed ruefully:
The Court's decisions today are the culmination of a recent trend
of constitutional innovation which virtually emasculates [the] historic
power of a trial judge .... [F]rom the hodge-podge of legal doctrine
embodied in these decisions, which have irretrievably blended together constitutional guarantees of jury trial in criminal cases, con-

stitutional guarantees of impartial judges, and fragments of the law of
contempt in federal courts, the only consistent thread which emerges
is this Court's inveterate propensity to second-guess the trial judge.4 7
Although Justice Rehnquist may have been overstating the matter
somewhat, it is true that since Sacher the Supreme Court has imposed one constitutional limitation after another on the exercise of
the summary contempt power. Additionally, the Court, exercising
its supervisory powers over lower federal courts, has imposed standards of fair procedure that have themselves blended into constitutional doctrines and thus have equally limited the power of state
court judges. These limitations have usually revolved around (A)
the circumstances in which the summary contempt power may be
44 In certain circumstances involving out-of-court contempts, Congress had provided for the right to trial by jury. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 687-88
(1964); GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 165-67. A number of states have similarly limited
the extent to which a judge may punish for contempt without a jury trial. For example, a Kentucky statute, KY. REV. STAT. § 432.260 (1975), limited the power of a
judge to punish for contempt without a jury to a maximum of $30 or 30 hours' imprisonment. The statute was held violative of the Kentucky constitution as an improper
interference with judicial power when Taylor v. Hayes was before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. See Taylor v. Hayes, 494 S.W.2d 737, 745 (1973), rev'd, 418 U.S.
488 (1974); note 241 infra.
45 In Sacher the sentences ranged from 30 days to six months in jail. Tile real
significance of the contempt convictions against the attorneys in Sacher was the bar
disciplinary action that followed. For a discussion of this point, see DISORDER IN
THE COURT, supra note 15, at 54-55.
46 418 U.S. 506, 523 (1974). Codispoti, decided the same day as Taylor, involved
the applicability of the jury trial guaranty to cases of multiple contempts.
47 418 U.S. at 524.
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exercised, (B) the disqualification of the trial judge and (C) the
right to a jury trial.
A.

The Circumstances in Which the Sumnary Contempt
Power May be Exercised

The Court has made it clear that the summary contempt
power may not be exercised against even in-court contempts unless
all the facts giving rise to the charge are personally observed by
the trial judge. This requirement is illustrated most clearly by

Johnson v. Mississippi.48 In that case the judge had directed the

bailiffs and deputies to keep all persons entering the courtroom
from walking in a certain area while jurors were being called. After
being directed around this area by a deputy, the contemnor allegedly refused to move and "then continued to stand and look
around over the room, disrupting the court proceedings." 49 The

judge then ordered him removed from the courtroom and the next
day issued an order directing the defendant to appear before the
court the following week. After the occurrence of a number of
other matters (which, as will be discussed subsequently, were held
to require the judge's recusal50 ), the judge summarily held the defendant in contempt. The Supreme Court found on due process
grounds that the judge should not have proceeded summarily, because the record did not show him to have been "personally aware
of the contemptuous action when it occurred,"'' 5 but rather indicated that the sheriff and the deputy had "related to the Judge
what had transpired." 52 The contemnor was thus entitled to a "fair
hearing . . . to show that the version of the event related to the

judge was inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete.' 5 3 In sum, allegedly contemptuous conduct not only must occur in the courtby the trial judge before he
room but must be witnessed personally
can proceed summarily to punish it. 5 4
48 403 U.S. 212 (1971).

at 213.
See note 91 infra.

491d.
50

51 403 U.S. at 215.

=Id.

5Id.

54 But see In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889). In Groppi r. Lsli,, 404 U.S. 496
(1972), this principle was extended to legislative contempts. There the Assembly of
the Wisconsin Legislature passed a resolution citing the defendant for contempt on
the ground that two days previously he had interrupted its proceedings by leading a
disorderly group of people onto the floor of the Assembly during a session. The
contempt resolution was adopted without giving notice to the defendant or affording
him an opportunity to defend. The Supreme Court held that the guarantees of procedural due process applied to legislative contempts and that when the citation for
contempt did not occur until a later date, the legislature could not proceed sutmmar-
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Even these limitations, however, cannot be applied mechanically to sanction the exercise of the summary contempt power. In
Harris v. United States, 55 the Supreme Court overturned a contempt conviction that had issued only after events leading to the
charge had been orchestrated to lend themselves to a summary
proceeding. In Harris a recalcitrant grand jury witness was summarily convicted under rule 42(a) after he and the grand jury were
brought before a federal district judge and the witness's original
refusal to answer a question was repeated in the judge's presence.
Overruling a contrary decision rendered only six years previously, 56 the Court found that the judge was precluded from proceeding under rule 42(a), because the "real contempt" occurred before the grand jury. 5 7 The defendant's appearance before the judge
was found to have been an ancillary proceeding, undertaken for the
sole purpose of rendering rule 42(a) applicable. 5 8 The contemnor
had made clear his position before the grand jury, and, in his appearance before the judge, "the dignity of the court was not being
affronted. '59 The Court concluded that rule 42(b) "prescribes the
'procedural regularity' for all contempts in the federal regime except those unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial institution itself."GO
However, in United States v. Wilson, 6 ' the Court held that a
judge could proceed summarily under rule 42(a) to punish a criminal trial witness who had refused to testify following a grant of
immunity, distinguishing Harris on the ground that it "did 2not deal
with a refusal to testify which obstructed an ongoing trial."6
Of course, in Harris the Court was rendering a decision with
respect to the applicability of rule 42(a), and it would not necessarfly follow that a similar sequence of events in state court would
ily. The Court distinguished the legislature's action from that of a judge acting at the
close of a trial by pointing out that all of the legislators voting on the contempt
citation might not have personally observed the prior events that gave rise to the
charge. This possibility meant that as a matter of due process the contemnor was

entitled to notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 505, 507, It
may be queried whether the legislature could have acted summarily even If it imposed the contempt citation on the spot, since there would be no way of knowing
whether all the legislators had personally observed the relevant events.
55382 U.S. 162 (1965).
56 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
57382 U.S. at 164.
58
59
60

Id. at 164-65.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 167.

61 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
62

Id.

at 318.
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violate due process if, as in Harris, the defendant were given the
full opportunity to explain his reasons for refusing to testify.6 3
Apart from this possibility, however, Johnson makes it clear
that the summary contempt power can be exercised consistently
with due process only when the conduct giving rise to the contempt charges occurs in the courtroom and is personally observed
64
by the judge.
B. Disqualificationof the Trial Judge
In a clear departure from Sacher, the Supreme Court has limited the power of a judge to try contempt charges-at least where
he does not act instantly-to cases where he has not become "personally embroiled in controversy" with the alleged contemnor . 5 In other words, when a judge waits until the end of a trial to
punish contempts committed in his presence, lack of impartiality
on his part will require his recusal, just as if he were seeking to
punish for out-of-court contempts. The first case to impose this restriction was Offutt v. United States,66 decided only three years
after Sacher. There, as in Sacher, the judge waited until the end of
the trial to punish an attorney,6 7 but in his interchanges with the
contemnor the trial judge had "revealed an attitude which hardly
reflected the restraints of conventional judicial demeanor,"6 and
he was in fact described by the Court in a later case as "an activist
seeking combat." 69 On this basis the Court distinguished Sacher:
The [contempt] power

. .

entrusted to a judge is wholly unrelated

to his personal sensibilities, be they tender or rugged. But judges
also are human, and may, in a human way, quite unwittingly identify
offense to self with obstruction to law. Accordingly, this Court has
In Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), the Court held that summary imprisonment of a witness for refusal to answer questions before a grand jury

constituted civil rather than criminal contempt, entitling the recalcitrant witness to
be released when the grand jury was discharged.
The failure of an attorney to appear in court on time has generally been held
not to constitute a contempt committed in the actual presence of the court that would
justify summary disposition under rule 42(a). E.g., United States v. Delahanty, 488
F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Lamson, 468 F.2d 551 (Ist Cir. 1972); United States v.
Willett, 432 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1970). Contra, In re Niblack, 476 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954).
66 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
65

67 The judge imposed a sentence of 10 days' imprisonment. The District of Columbia Circuit upheld the conviction but reduced the punishment to 48 hours. Id. at
12.

MId.

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). For two of the more
egregious examples of the Offutt trial judge's behavior, see 348 U.S. at 16-17 nn.-3.
69
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deemed it important that district judges guard against this easy confusion by not sitting themselves in judgment upon misconduct of
is entangled with the judge's
counsel where the contempt charged
70
personal feeling against the lawyer.
The Court thus held that the principles of Cooke v. United
States, 7 1 requiring the disqualification of a trial judge who could
not impartially try the charges, applied. However, the Court was
careful to note that a personally entangled judge would be required
to recuse himself only "where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private
right."-72 Thus, Offutt might be narrowly read to cover only those
cases in which the trial judge defers punishment until the close of a
trial.
In In re Murchison, 73 decided one year after Offutt, the Court
dealt with what may be called the "institutional bias" of the judge.
That case involved a variation of the situation presented in In re
Oliver,74 where the judge, functioning as a one-man grand jury,
summarily punished a witness believed to have committed perjury
in the grand jury proceedings. In Murchison the judge also believed that a witness had committed perjury in the grand jury proceedings, but he held a hearing on the contempt charges. A similar
hearing was held for a witness who had simply refused to answer
questions. Both were found guilty of contempt. The Supreme
Court reversed the convictions because the judge, having been an
integral part of the process leading up to the charges, could not be
"in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction
or acquittal of the accused."-75 The Court also noted that the
judge's recollection of what occurred when he was functioning as a
grand jury was likely to weigh more heavily with him than any
testimony given at the subsequent hearing and further pointed out
that to sustain their defenses the defendants might have to crossexamine the judge himself 76 Concluding that "[flair trials are too
important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be
trial judges of the charges they prefer," 77 the Court held that for
the judge to try the contempt charges would be violative of due
process.
U.S. at 14.
267 U.S. 517 (1925), discussed in text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
72 348 U.S. at 14, quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
73 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
74 333 U.S. 257 (1948), discussed in text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
75 349 U.S. at 137.
76 Id.
at 138-39.
77Id. at 137.
7o 348
71
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The only case in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the trial judge's impartiality in the post-Sacher period has
been Ungar v. Sarafite.78 In that case the defendant contended
that the judge lacked impartiality both because the defendant's
contemptuous remarks constituted a personal attack upon the judge
and because the judge's responses revealed a bias against the defendant. The defendant, a lawyer, was called as a hostile witness in
a conspiracy-to-obstruct-justice trial. He interposed his own objections to the form of the questions asked and was unresponsive to a
number of questions. On several occasions the trial judge had to
instruct him not to rephrase questions or offer gratuitous testimony, but despite admonishments, he continued this behavior.
On the third day of the trial, when instructed to give a responsive
answer to a question, the defendant obtained a recess but was denied permission to leave the stand. He then said he could not and
would not testify further and accused the judge of "coerc[ing] and
intimidat[ing]" him and of "suppressing the evidence." 79 The judge
replied, "You are not only contemptuous but disorderly and
insolent."8 0 After this interchange, the defendant received medical
assistance and resumed his testimony. Following the trial the judge
issued an order against the defendant to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt. The defendant appeared and argued unsuccessfully that the case should be continued and heard before
another judge. Refusing to defend further, he was found guilty,
fined, and sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment.8 1
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice White,
found that the defendant had not been deprived of due process
when he was tried by the judge before whom the contemptuous
conduct occurred. It held first that the defendant had not launched
a personal attack upon the judge, which would have required his
disqualification. Refining the standards for disqualification enunciated in Cooke and Offutt, the Court stated:
[W]e are unwilling to bottom a constitutional rule of disqualification
solely upon . . . disobedience to court orders and criticism of its
rulings during the course of a trial.... We cannot assume that judges
are so irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially
deal with resistance to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their decisions ....[The defendant's
statements were] disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable commen78376 U.S. 575
79Id. at 580.

(1964).

&Id.
81
Id. at 581.
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tary, but hardly an insulting attack upon the integrity of the
judge
82
carrying such potential for bias as to require disqualification.
Disallowing the contention that the judge's remarks demonstrated bias on his part, the Ungar Court looked to the totality of
the judge's conduct and concluded that he did not allow himself to
become personally embroiled with the petitioner. 83 It also emphasized that the judge did not proceed summarily, "but gave
notice and afforded an opportunity for a hearing which was conducted dispassionately and with a decorum befitting a judicial
proceeding."-8 4 The judge's reference to the defendant's conduct as
being "not only contemptuous, but disorderly and insolent," was
characterized as a "declaration of a charge against the petitioner,
based on the judge's observations, which, without more, was not a
constitutionally disqualifying prejudgment of guilt."8 5 The Court
concluded that there was not "such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance
between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of
86
the accused."
Ungar is particularly significant in that the Court assumed that
the constitutional test for disqualification of a state court judge in
contempt proceedings was the same as the test applicable to federal judges. At the same time, the Court indicated that not every
improper remark addressed to the judge would constitute a personal attack, and that bias could not be established without considering the totality of the judge's conduct in the case.
Maybermj v. Pennsylvania87 is a good example of conduct that
will constitute a personal attack on the judge and thus disqualify
him from sitting in judgment on a contempt charge. Mayberry, a
criminal defendant representing himself, addressed epithets to the
judge during the trial such as "dirty sonofabitch," "dirty tyrannical
old dog," "stumbling dog" and "fool." 88 He accused the judge of
"running a Spanish Inquisition," and told him to "Go to hell" and
"Keep [his] mouth shut." 89 At the conclusion of the trial, the judge
found the defendant guilty of 11 counts of contempt and sentenced
him to a total of between 11 and 22 years' imprisonment.
Id. at 584.
3Id. at 585.
84 Id. at 588.
85 Id. at 587.
86 Id. at 588.
87 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
8Id.
at 466.
82
8

89 Id.
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In holding that the judge could not impartially try the contempt charges, the Supreme Court first noted that since the contemnor was a defendant and not an attorney defending another, he
would not have been unfairly prejudiced by an immediate exercise
of the summary contempt power, as might have the defendant in
Sacher. But since the judge did not act at the time the contempt
was committed, the Court was of the view that "it is generally vise
where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings
to ask a fellow judge to take [one's] place." 90 Although the judge
was not an activist seeking combat but rather "the target
of petitioner's insolence," disqualification was constitutionally required, for, as the Court observed: "a judge, vilified as was this
*..judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that
p
calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication. "91
It should be noted that in all of these cases the judge waited
until after the trial or until a later date to punish the contempts.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has yet to hold that immediate
summary punishment doled out by a judge embroiled in controversy with the contemnor would violate due process. 92 But
when the judge waits until the end of the trial to punish for
contempt-as apparently is the common practice, particularly
where the alleged contemnor is a lawyer-his demonstrated lack of
impartiality will preclude him not only from acting summarily but
also from sitting in judgment on the charges.
9OId. at
91 Id. at

464.
465. In Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971). discussed in text
accompanying notes 48-54 supra, the Court found a lack of impartiality because of
the trial judge's involvement with the defendant lawyer in matters other than those
relating to the contempt charge itself. After the judge had issued a show-cause order
against him, the defendant filed a motion, supported by other lawyers' affidavits,
asking that the judge recuse himself because of his bias against the defendant, the
civil rights organizations he represented and the lawyers' organization defending
him. No hearing was ever held on that motion. Subsequently the defendant and
others filed a federal suit against the judge, which resulted in an order enjoining the
judge from discriminating "by race, color or sex" in jury selection in his court. Id. at
214. Two days after the order was issued the judge imposed the contempt sentence
against the defendant. In holding that the judge could not constitutionally sit in
judgment on the contempt charges or preside over the retrial on those charges, the
Court felt it "plain that [the judge] was so enmeshed in matters involving petitioner
as to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit."
Id. at 215-16. The imposition
of the contempt sentence in juxtaposition with the entry of the federal court judgment against the judge made the lack of impartiality abundantly clear and vms akin
to the "institutional bias" that was the basis of the Court's decision in Murchison.
92 The fact that the judge proceeds summarily without giving the accused any
opportunity to be heard in his defense is strong evidence of the judge's embroilment. See note 311 infra.
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C. The Right to a Jury Trial
As it existed at the time Sacher was decided, the summary
contempt power legitimized judicial imposition of severe sentences
on defendants who were not even afforded the opportunity to present available defenses, much less the chance to argue such defenses before a jury. Recognizing the possibility of abuse attending
this situation, the Supreme Court has finally reached the apparent
conclusion that punishment for contempt, whether by summary
procedure or otherwise, cannot be imposed without the intervention of a jury when the maximum sentence authorized by statute or
the sentence actually imposed in the absence of such a statute is at
least six months' imprisonment. Defendants in contempt cases had
long argued that they were entitled to a jury trial as in the case of
other "serious crimes," but this argument had been consistently
rejected by the Court:9 3 at the time the Constitution was adopted
the English courts summarily punished both in-court and out-of94
court contempts.
Justice Black had repeatedly attacked the constitutionality of
the summary contempt power itself on due process grounds, and
he included in his attack the argument that the right to a jury trial
applied to criminal contempt in the same manner as it applied to
other crimes. 9 5 In a 1964 decision, United States v. Barnett,96 he
concurred in a dissenting opinion by Justice Goldberg which traced
at length the historical development of the contempt power and
found that when the Constitution was adopted, those criminal contempts triable without a jury were usually subject to only "trivial
penalties." 97 These contempts did not differ from other "petty
crimes" that could at that time be punished without a jury's determination of guilt. 98 The dissent thus would have condemned as
unconstitutional "the relatively recent practice of imposing serious
punishment for criminal contempts without a trial by jury." 9
Two years later, in Cheff v. Schnackenberg,100 a plurality of
the Court, joined on the particular issue by Justices Black and
93 In United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694 (1964), the Court observed that
there had been "at least 50 cases of this Court that support summary disposition of
contempts, without reference to any distinction based on the seriousness of the offense."
94 See id. at 692-700; Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-87 (1958).
95 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 201-19 (1958) (dissenting opinion);
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
96 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
97
Id. at 751.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 740.
100 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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Douglas, exercised the Court's supervisory power over lower federal courts to require that criminal contempt sentences in excess of
six months not be imposed -without a jury trial or waiver of such a
trial by the defendant. Justices Black and Douglas again argued
that criminal contempt was a "crime" within the meaning of article
III, section 2101 and of the sixth amendment, 10 2 and thus that the
right to trial by jury applied to all criminal contempt proceedings
regardless of the length of the sentence. 103
In Bloom v. Illinois,1' 4 decided in 1968, a majority of the
Court finally came around to the view that a criminal contempt
could be a "serious offense" to which the right to trial by jury
would attach under the sixth amendment. Bloom was decided the
same day as Duncan v. Louisiana,10 5 in which the Court held that
the sixth amendment's guaranty of the right to trial by jury in
"serious" criminal cases applied to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In holding in Bloom, over
the dissent of Justices Stewart and Harlan,1 0 6 that the right to a
jury trial attached to serious contempts as well, 10 7 the Court stated
that
serious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they
are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now binding on the States, and . . . the traditional rule is constitutionally
infirm as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried without
honoring a demand for a jury trial .... 108
Indeed, the Court not only felt that criminal contempt was "a
crime in the ordinary sense, 1 0° 9 but believed that the defendant
charged with that crime had greater needs than others for a jury
101"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
102 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103

384 U.S. at 384 (dissenting opinion).

104 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
105 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
106 391 U.S. at 215. The

dissent argued both that the right to trial by jury did not
apply to criminal contempts and that the sixth amendment's guaranty of trial by jury
was not applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.
107 In Bloom the defendant had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
Since the Court held in Duncan that an offense for which a maximum sentence of
two years' imprisonment was authorized was a "serious- one within the meaning of
the trial-by-jury guaranty, there was no question that Bloom had been charged with a
"serious" offense.
108 391 U.S. at 198.
109 Id. at 201.
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trial, because of the possible arbitrary or biased responses of judges
to whom contempts were directed."i 0 Nor was the Court persuaded to subordinate this fundamental individual protection to
the need for maintaining order in the courtroom. Asserting that
will be engendered, not by the fear of
"[g]enuine respect .
unlimited authority, but by the firm administration of the law
through those institutionalized procedures which have been worked
out over the centuries," 1 1 ' the majority maintained that the interests in preserving courts' dignity and processing contempts efficiently would be adequately served by the unaffected power to try
petty contempts without jury trials. 1 12 But with respect to serious
contempts, to which the jury trial guaranty was held to apply,
neither state nor federal trial judges could any longer impose
punishment summarily, notwithstanding that such contempts might
occur in the presence of the judge.
In Bloom, which involved a two-year sentence, the Court did
not find it necessary to specify what constituted a serious contempt
within the meaning of the trial-by-jury guaranty.1 13 One year later,
in Frank v. United States, 1 14 the Court denied a jury trial to a
contemnor given a suspended sentence and placed on probation for
three years. The Court first noted that a maximum sentence authorized by statute could be taken as a legislative expression of the
seriousness of a crime and would thus control a defendant's right to
a jury trial. "15 Pointing out that Congress had not placed any limits
on punishments that might be imposed for the wide variety of contempts occurring in federal courts, the Court held that, in the absence of an authorized maximum sentence, "the severity of the
penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of
116
the particular offense."
It remained only to establish the watershed penalty that would
divide serious contempts from petty contempts. In Baldwin v. New
York, 117 involving the right to a jury trial in a noncontempt situa110 Id. at 202.
111 Id. at 208.

112 Id. at 208-09. The Court also noted that "recalcitrant" juries might occasionally refuse to convict defendants who had actually committed contempts, but it recognized that such "miscarriages of justice" were an unavoidable aspect of the jury
system and could no more justify denying a contemnor a jury trial than any other
criminal defendant. Id. at 209.
113 In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), decided the
same day as Bloom, the Court, faced with a punishment for contempt of 10 days'
imprisonment, held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial and observed
that "it is clear that a six month sentence is short enough to be 'petty.' " Id. at 220.

114 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
115 Id. at 149.
Ie' Id.
117 399

U.S. 66 (1970).
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tion, the Court held in effect that the right to a jury trial attaches
whenever the authorized penalty for an offense exceeds six months.
Justices White, Brennan and Marshall took this position and
formed the plurality, while Justices Black and Douglas, concurring
in the result, took the position that the right to a jury trial applied
to all criminal offenses.118
Based on Baldwin, then, and using the approach taken to
criminal contempts in Frank, the right to trial by jury would obtain
in criminal contempt cases whenever an applicable statute authorized punishment in excess of six months' imprisonment or
whenever the punishment actually imposed exceeded six months.
In such cases, of course, the jury trial guaranty would preclude the
judge from proceeding summarily. However, the case law of the
early 1970's would indicate that if the punishment authorized-or,
in the absence of statutory authorization, if the punishment actually
imposed--does not exceed six months, a judge may summarily
punish contempts committed in his presence." 9
D. A Summanj
Thus, the post-Sacher years saw the Supreme Court impose
some very significant limitations on the exercise of the summary
contempt power. At the end of that period, before the "political
trials" of the 1970's, that power could be exercised only when the
contempt was committed in the courtroom itself and when all of
the facts were personally observed by the judge. Further, a judge
who waited until the end of a trial to act could not himself impose
punishment if he had become personally embroiled in controversy
with the defendant. And the trial-by-jury guaranty would bar summary punishment in excess of six months' imprisonment regardless
of the conditions under which the contempt occurred or of the
judge's attitude towards the contemnor.
Although it was still assumed after Bloom and Frank that the
trial judge could proceed summarily when the alleged contempt
was committed in his presence and was personally observed by
him,1 2 0 even this power was apparently less than absolute. For example, the judge was required to hold a hearing if a question ex12
isted over the defendant's mental responsibility for his conduct. 1
118 Id. at 74-75. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented.
The Chief Justice objected to the imposition of a uniform six-month test, id.at 77,
while Justices Harlan and Stewart continued to argue that the jury trial guaranty
not be imposed on the states. Id. at 117-38, 143-45.
should
119
See DisORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 242-24.
120 See, e.g., United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962); C. WRICHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 708 (1969).
121Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (1963).
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Moreover, as the Supreme Court observed in Groppi v. Leslie,122
even in summary contempt proceedings the contemnor was "normally . . . given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf in the
nature of a right of allocution.'123 All in all, the summary contempt
power had come to be a far less formidable weapon in the hands of
the trial judge than it had been at the time of Sacher.

IV
THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER AND THE
"POLITICAL TRiAL"

In the late 1960's and early 1970's there occurred a number of
what may be called, at least from the perspective of the defendants
and their lawyers, "political trials." The term "political trial" is the
subject of much controversy, and it may have become "so valueladen that its usefulness as an analytic concept has been
undermined.' 2 4 Still, political trials have been defined variously as
"trials in which public opinions and public attitudes on
one or
more social questions will have an effect on the decisions,' 2 5 trials
that the "defendants and their counsel are using . . . for political
ends,' 1 26 trials in which there is the "perception of a direct threat
to established political power,"' 12 7 and trials that "can be used to
28
shift political power."
The Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in its widely respected
study Disorderin the Court, concluded that political considerations
may affect the judicial system in three different areas. First, the
decision to prosecute may be motivated by political factors. 12 9 See404 U.S. 496 (1972), discussed in note 54 supra.
Id. at 504. Even in Sacher the defendants were given the opportunity to
speak after sentence was imposed. See note 29 supra.
124 DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 79. Many judges, prosecutors and
establishment lawyers continue to insist that there is no such thing as a political
trial. See, e.g., id. at 77-78 (statement of Louis Nizer); Burger, The Necessity for
Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 212-14 (1971); Karlen, Disorder in the Courtroom, 44 S.
CAL. L. REv. 996, 1007-08 (1971). At the other end of the spectrum, lawyers who
make a practice of representing poor, young, minority or unpopular defendants contend that a political trial is "any trial in which the defendant feels he is not getting a
fair shake." DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 78 (statement of William
Kunstler).
125 Burnstein, Trying a Political Case, 28 GUILD PRAC. 33 (1969), reprinted in
DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 78.
126 DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 78 (statement of Richard Uviller).
127 POLITICAL TRIALS xi (T. Becker ed. 1971), quoted in DISORDER IN THE
COURT, supra note 15, at 78.
128 DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 78, discussing 0. KIRCHEIMER,
122
123

POLITICAL JUSTICE 47 (1961).
129 Id.

at 80-84.
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ond, the outcome of the case may be affected by political attitudes
or considerations.1 30 Third, the participants in a case, either before
or during a trial, may behave in such a way as to maximize the
political consequences or impact of the legal action. 131 Regardless
of the definition of the "political trial," or even the utility of that
term as a means of analysis, it is difficult to dispute the conclusion
of the Special Committee that political considerations do affect the
judicial system, and it is the political trial, however defined, that
brings to the fore the problems of courtroom disorder. 132 When
such problems do arise, experience indicates that the exercise of
the summary contempt power will not infrequently follow. 13 Thus,
in recent years the question of limitations on that power has often
arisen in the context of political trials.
This has been particularly so in prosecutions arising out of acts
of protest against the Vietnam war. These prosecutions showcased
political considerations affecting the judicial system. The motivation
of the Government in bringing these actions may well have been
something more than the even-handed enforcement of the criminal
law: 1' even unsuccessful prosecutions could have significantly
blunted the antiwar movement. 13 The defendants were political
activists and, to say the least, were not above using the courtroom
for political purposes. Their lawyers were often committed to similar political objectives' 36 and were fully cognizant of the interaction
Id. at 84-86.
1 Id. at 86-88.
13 2
Id. at 89.
130
3

133

See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1(1951) (Communist Party leaders
accused of conspiring against the Government); cases discussed in text accompanying notes 174-91 infra; cf. Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950)
(deportation proceedings against alleged Communist involved in labor disputes).
134 In a conspiracy prosecution the Government is in an especially advantageous
position to achieve its political objectives by indicting particular defendants. The
variety of defendants in Spock v. United States, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), may
serve to demonstrate this point. Indicting and convicting Dr. Spock, the most prominent antiwar spokesman, could both discredit the antiwar movement and show that
prominence and respectability afforded no protection. Prosecuting Reverend Coffin
would send a message to the antiwar clergy and to those young men who relied on
their leadership. Goodman's prosecution would be a warning to the academic community, and the conviction of Farber would show that any student could get caught
in the net. The Government, of course, would deny that it ever intended such lessons.
Concerning the role of the prosecution in political trials, see DISORDER LN THE
CoURT, supra note 15, at 178-81. As to the hazards of prosecutorial misconduct in
such cases, see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1972).
- "The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive
from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.'" Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
13 Concerning the role of the lawyer in using the legal system to achieve political objectives, see Kinoy, The Role of the Radical Lawyer and Teacher of Law:
Some Reflections, 29 GUILD PnAc. 3 (1970).
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between legal and political strategy in the courtroom.' 3 7 Finally,
judges in these trials, even if ordinarily neutral and detached, were
not infrequently disposed to use their power, consciously or unconsciously, to help the Government obtain a conviction and thereby
assist it in accomplishing its political objectives. 38
Given the confrontation-oriented politics of the day, this cast
of courtroom characters rounded out a scenario especially likely to
produce the sort of disorder that would prompt the exercise of the
summary contempt power. 139 Those who would have further limited the power faced their crucible: if ever the liberal exercise of
the summary contempt power were justifiable, it would have been
so in these trials, and any evaluation of the power undertaken in
the early 1970's must almost necessarily reflect the then-pervasive
sentiment for preserving order in the courtroom. This section of
the Article will test these theses against actual appraisals of the
contempt power in the early 1970's and against the pattern of appellate court decisions that dealt with contempts in political trials.
The conclusions reached will hopefully reveal which way the summary contempt winds ought to be blowing and will serve to guide
consideration of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements
on the subject in Taylor v. Hayes.

The most notorious of the political trials was the "Chicago 7"
conspiracy trial. 140 In the view of the defendants and their lawyers,
137In some cases acquittal might be thought to depend upon raising the level of
the jury's political consciousness. In other situations the defense might decide to

achieve political objectives at the risk of increasing the likelihood of a conviction.
138 See Sedler, Book Review, supra note 8, at 1081-83.
139The inherent human unfairness of the summary contempt power was most
clearly exposed in the "Chicago 7" conspiracy trial. See text accompanying notes
140-45 infra. As Professor Herman Schwartz has observed:
The two Hoffmans played to each other in Chicago, except that Julius had all
the power and almost none of the restraints, although Abbie may have had
the better lines. Although some judges see themselves as martyrs, it is still
the defendants who face prison terms in a contest where the prosecution has
most of the advantages, not the least of which is money, and experienced
investigative resources; Abbie Hoffman may go to jail for five years, but
Julius Hoffman went to Florida with a stop at the White House for breakfast
where he met "my banker" former Treasury Secretary David Kennedy....
Schwartz, Judges as Tyrants, 7 CmUM. L. BULL. 129, 133 (1971). When the contempt
charges were retried before another judge, he found the defendants not guilty of all
but 13 of the 52 remanded charges, and he refused to impose any sentence beyond
those already served, observing that
the contumacious conduct of the defendants and their lawyers cannot be considered apart from the conduct of the trial judge and prosecutors. Each
reacted to provocation by the other, and the tensions generated during four
and a half months of so acrimonious a trial cannot be ignored....
In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
14o
See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972) (substantive of-
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the Government was using the prosecution to show that socialchange activists were responsible for the violence surrounding the
Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968.141 Likewise, they felt

that the trial judge, District Judge Julius Hoffman, was using his
judicial power in every way possible to help the Government obtain a conviction. 14 The defendants' views appear to have been

borne out by the Seventh Circuit's reversal of all the convictions on
the ground that the behavior of the judge and the prosecutor

"would require reversal if other errors did not. -1 43 At the trial, the

defendants' and lawyers' reaction to their perceived situation was

widely interpreted as "courtroom disruption." In response to this
disruption, the trial judge wielded the summary contempt power as
a meat-ax. He declared a mistrial with respect to defendant Bobby
Seale, summarily found him guilty of 16 acts of contempt and imposed consecutive three-month sentences totaling four years'
imprisonment. 144 At the end of the trial, he summarily found all
other defendants and their lawyers guilty of numerous counts of

contempt and imposed sentences ranging from two months and 18
days for defendant Weiner to four years and 13 days for attorney

Kunstler. 1-4 While the summary contempt power was also exercised in political cases such as that of the "D.C.9"146 and "Tacoma

fense); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972) (original contempt
charges); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (same); In re Dellinger, 370
F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Il. 1973), affd, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975) (contempt charges on remand). The case was originally referred to as

the "Chicago 8" trial but became the "Chicago 7" trial when a mistrial was declared
as to Bobby Seale.
141 See Dellinger, The Making of a Conspiracy, in THE CoNsPIRAcY 144-57 (D.
Babcox, C. Babcox & B. Abel eds. 1969); Kunstler, The Chicago Eight Prosecution:A
Perversion of Law, in THE CONSPIRACY, supra at 27-40.
142 See Kunstler, supra note 141, at 3840.
'4
United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 391 (7th Cir. 1972). On appeal. the
court found that the trial judge had demonstrably exercised his discretion against the
defense and in favor of the Government and had acted unreasonably in giving admonitions to and restricting the examination of defense witnesses. Id. at 387. But,
above all else, the judge's "deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the
defense" in the presence of the jury required reversal. Id. at 386. In addition. the
remarks of the prosecutor-particularly his closing argument to the jury, during
which he referred to the defendants as "evil men," "violent anarchists" and the
like-"were not justified... and fell below the standards applicable to a representative of the United States." Id. at 389-90.
144 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1972).
145 In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1972). The specifications and
sentences as to each defendant are set out in this opinion. Id. at 402-65.
14 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (substantive
offense); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (original contempt
charges); United States v. Meyer, 346 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1972) (contempt charges
on remand). The case is discussed in DISORDER LNTHE COURT, supra note 15, at 75.
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trials, it was the Chicago 7 case that gave rise to the spectre
of "disruptive defendants represented by contemptuous lawyers."
The outcry was loud and furious. The American College of
Trial Lawyers, "deeply concerned by the tactics of trial disruption,"'14 8 appointed a blue-ribbon committee to investigate the
problem. 1 49 Chief Justice Burger spoke of "adrenalin-fueled
lawyers" who "at the drop of a hat-or less-cry out that theirs is a
'political trial,' " and for whom "rules of evidence, canons of ethics
and codes of professional conduct-the necessity for civility-all
become irrelevant.- 150 In a number of jurisdictions, new legislation
was enacted or new rules of court adopted, all designed to prevent
"disruptive behavior in court."'1 5 American courts, it seemed,
faced a crisis.
It was in this atmosphere that the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York appointed a Special Committee on Courtroom
Conduct to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the nature and
extent of the purported problem. The Special Committee's analysis
included an empirical study based upon a detailed questionnaire
about courtroom disruption sent to every trial judge of general
jurisdiction in the United States and to lower criminal court judges
in New York City and California. 152 A similar questionnaire was
sent to the 93 United States Attorneys and to the district attorneys
of the 69 largest jurisdictions.1 53 An unusually high return was received, and the Committee sent out follow-up questionnaires to all
54
respondents. 1
The results produced a "most startling revelation": there was
no serious quantitative problem of disruption in American
courts."' 5 Further, such disruption as was reported did not occur
in politically oriented trials, but in ordinary felony cases.1 56 As the
Committee noted:
7"147

147 This trial ended in a mistrial, and contempt citations followed. The contempt
convictions were set aside in United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1971).
On remand, the defendants pleaded nolo contendere to the contempt charges and
were sentenced to varying jail terms. See DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at

75.

supra note 15, at 3-4.
The members of the Committee included Whitney North Seymour, former
president of the American Bar Association, Simon Rifkind, a former federal judge,
Edward Bennett Williams, the noted criminal lawyer, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., now
a Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. at 3.
150 Burger, supra note 130, at 213.
151 DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 4-5.
152 Id. at 5.
153 Id. at 7.
154 Id. at 5-7. The questionnaires are set out in Appendices. Id. at 267-332.
I55 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
148 DISORDER IN THE COURT,
149

156

Id.
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The breakdown of figures indicates that courtroom disruption is
primarily a problem of highly emotional defendants, disturbed about
serious criminal charges facing them, often unhappy with their
lawyers and concerned that the proceedings are somehow stacked
against them. Many factors may contribute to disruption in such
cases: the long prison term facing the defendant, the tactics of the
prosecution, the presence of friends or relatives, and the attitude of
the judge. In many cases, the judges reported that they were able to
handle the disruptions simply by impressing on the defendants that
they would receive a fair trial and acting to protect the defendants'
rights.
In hventy-one of the cases, the judges reported that there were
some political overtones to the disruption. For the most part this
involved spectators creating a disturbance in the court to show their
support of the defendant and his political philosophy. The disorders
were generally handled by ordering the court cleared. In other cases,
the defendant in an ordinary criminal trial uttered certain radical
slogans to attack the proceedings or to justify his actions although
there was no political component to the crimes he was charged with.
In only four cases were the defendants political activists charged with
crimes with some political coloration
(selective service violations, stu57
dent demonstrations, etc.).'
Disruption caused by lawyers was found to be even less significant. 158 To say the least, as the Committee concluded, the
problem of courtroom disorder has been "overemphasized." 15 9
Other studies have also debunked the myth of the disruptive defendant and the contemptuous lawyer and have revealed that courtroom disorder is simply not a serious problem in American
society. 1 60
The Special Committee also analyzed the exercise of the summary contempt power as reflected in the reported decisions of appellate courts. That analysis bore out the point, long ago recognized by the Supreme Court, that a judge's decision to punish
contempts summarily is "arbitrary in its nature and liable to
abuse."' 161 From 1960 to 1972, there were 72 reported appellate
decisions reviewing summary contempt convictions; in 40 of these
cases (more than 50%), the convictions were reversed. Twentythree of the reversals were on the merits. 162 The Committee recommended that the summary contempt power be abolished in
toto.

16 3

157
Id.

158 Id. at 131-32.
159 Id. at 9.
160
6

See id. at 7-8 & nn.21-22, 24.
at 232, quoting Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 312 (1888).

1 1 Id.
162

DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 233-34.

16

Id. at 232-38.
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Contrary to what might have been expected, the myth of the
disruptive defendant and the contemptuous lawyers had little if any
effect on the federal appellate courts that reviewed the contempt
convictions arising out of the political trials of the late 1960's and
early 1970's. The courts of appeals continued to implement, and in
some cases to expand, the limitations on the exercise of the summary contempt power imposed by the Supreme Court in the
post-Sacher years. 164 In United States v. Seale, 165 for example, the
Seventh Circuit dealt with the trial judge's efforts to avoid jury
trials in the Chicago 7 contempt cases by imposing multiple consecutive sentences of no more than six months each, which in the
aggregate amounted to as much as four years' imprisonment. The
court of appeals held that a trial judge who acts immediately could
summarily impose punishment of up to six months for each separate contempt, regardless of the aggregate amount of the sentences. 16 6 However, the court held that the sentences had to be
aggregated for jury trial purposes if the judge waits until the end of
the trial to impose punishment. 167 Since the aggregate sentence
imposed on Seale exceeded six months, he was entitled to a jury
trial. The distinction between the two tests related to the perceived potential for abuse in permitting a judge to parcel out sentences in retrospect and thus control a defendant's right to a jury
trial. The court observed that a judge who delays punishment
"could review the record to single out 'discrete' instances
of contempt, impose up to six-month consecutive sentences for each instance and thereby [summarily] imprison the contemnor for a
theoretically unlimited term."' 6 8 Because this same potential for
abuse was not thought to be present when a judge acts to punish
for contempt on the spot, the court reasoned that in such a situation the sentences did not have to be aggregated when determining
69
a defendant's right to a jury trial.'
164 At the same time the Supreme Court was making it clear that the class of acts
that might constitute criminal contempt was subject to constitutional limitations, In
particular, holding that statements in court could not be punished as contempt unless
they created an "imminent... threat to the administration of justice." Eaton v. City of
Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974), quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947);
see In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965). And in the
recent case of Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), the Court held that a lawyer
could not be held in contempt for advising his client, in good faith, to refuse to produce subpoenaed material on the ground that it would violate the client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
165 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
166 Id. at 355-56.

16 7
16 8

Id.
Id.at 353.

169 The Supreme Court took the same approach in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 288-93 infra.
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In Seale the Seventh Circuit also held that the trial judge was
personally embroiled in controversy and could not impartially sit in
judgment on the contempt charges. The Government had conceded that Seale had launched the same kind of personal attack on
the judge that had been launched in Maybemj v. Pennsylvania 170
but it sought to distinguish Seale on the ground that the judge's
action was an "emergency measure to prevent a complete breakdown of the trial and to salvage the proceedings against the remaining defendants." 171 Rejecting this argument, the Court assumed
that the judge could have summarily punished contempts on the
spot notwithstanding his personal embroilment with Seale17 2 but
held that the alleged deterrent effect of summarily punishing Seale
after the fact was "simply too tenuous and improbable a ground to
overbalance the inherent possibility of prejudice to Seale in the
trial judge's acting himself." 173
In In re Dellinger,174 the Seventh Circuit reversed the remaining contempt convictions arising out of the Chicago 7 trial, including those of the attorneys. Under Seale, of course, all who received
an aggregate sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment were
entitled to a jury trial. On the issue of the disqualification of the
trial judge, the Government conceded that the convictions of the
nonlawyer defendants should be reversed under Mayberrj, but it
argued that the convictions of the lawyer defendants should be upheld under Sacher.1 75 The Seventh Circuit agreed that in Sacher
the contemptuous conduct of the lawyers included a personal attack
on the judge; nevertheless, it concluded that "cases subsequent to
Sacher have considerably undermined its vitality"17 6 and held that

when a judge delays punishment until the end of the trial, he cannot sit in judgment if he has been the victim of a personal
177

attack.

In United States v. Meyer,17 8 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the summary contempt conviction of the attorney for the D.C. 9 on the ground that there,
400 U.S. 455 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
461 F.2d at 351.
172 Id. This question was not resolved in Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 483 (1974);
see text accompanying notes 319-24 infra.
170
171

173 Id. at 352.
174 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).

Id. at 392.
L76
Id. at 393. The Court referred to Offutt, Ungar and Mayberrj. Id. at 393-94;
see text
77 accompanying notes 66-92 supra.
1 Id. at 395. The Court emphasized the "numerous and unprecedented attacks
and insults by both trial counsel." Id. at 396. The Court did not discuss the defendants' contention that the trial judge himself was an "activist seeking combat."
175

178 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:34

too, the judge had been the victim of a personal attack. The court
assumed, as did the Seventh Circuit in Dellinger, that even an embroiled judge could proceed summarily at the time contemptuous
conduct occurred, but it held that embroilment was a defense when
the judge waited until the end of the trial to act. 179 Interestingly
enough, when the charges were heard before another judge, the
lawyer was acquitted on all counts. 18 0 In United States v.
Marshall,18s the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary contempt
convictions arising out of the Tacoma 7 trial because the conduct
underlying one charge had occurred out of the judge's presence
and because the judge's contempt certificate relating to the other
charge failed to satisfy the requirements of rule 42(a). 182
Thus, the general pattern of appellate court reversal of summary convictions noted in the study of the Special Committee on
Courtroom Conduct also occurred with respect to the contempt
convictions arising out of the political trials of the late 1960's and
early 1970's. During the same period, the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts were defining more precisely the substantive
elements of the offense of criminal contempt,' 8 3 making it clear
that language or conduct would not amount to criminal contempt
unless it created a material and actual obstruction of the administration of justice. 184 In sum, limitations on the exercise of the
summary contempt power continued to expand despite widespread,
albeit unfounded, fears that disruptive defendants and contemptuous lawyers posed a serious threat to the judicial system. If anything, the political trials revealed even more graphically the abuses
inherent in the exercise of the summary contempt power and in
fact added impetus to the need for further limitation and even to a
possible challenge to the summary contempt power itself.

179 Id.
at 842-44. In the contempt certificate the judge had characterized the
lawyer's conduct as "insulting, derogatory and disrespectful." However, the Court
gave more weight to the nature of the conduct itself, in particular the fact that the
lawyer had accused the judge of determining the defendants' guilt in advance and of
being interested in "expeditiously dispatching the defendant to prison." Id. at
844-45.
180 United States v. Meyer, 346 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1972).
181 451 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1971).
182 Id.
at 376-77. See also note 147 supra.
183 Justice Black referred to the offense of criminal contempt as the offense "with
the most ill-defined and elastic contours in our law." Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165, 200 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
184 See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972); note 164 supra.
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V
TAYLOR V. HAYES: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN

A. The Factual Context
One of the advantages of the "view from within" is that it is
possible to discuss all dimensions of a case's factual context without
striving for impartiality. The following discussion of Taylor V.
Hayes is clearly based on the totality of the situation as perceived
by Taylor at the time the events in question occurred and as subsequently perceived by myself and co-counsel. 1 8 In our view, the
contempt convictions represented a flagrant abuse of power by a
trial judge who was determined to use his position in every way
possible to secure the conviction of Taylor's client and who reacted
to Taylor's challenges by invoking yet another power in his arsenal
of judicial authorityl 8 6 -that of summarily convicting an attorney of
criminal contempt.
Taylor v. Hayes arose out of the trial of two brothers, Narvel
and William Michael Tinsley-black youths charged with the wilful
murder of two white police officers in Louisville, Kentucky. As was
noted by both the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, the "murders created some considerable sensation in Louis[and] newspaper coverage was overly abundant." 18 7
ville .
Taylor, working without pay, represented Narvel Tinsley, and William Michael Tinsley was represented by three court-appointed
attorneys. The trial was held before Judge John P. Hayes of the
Jefferson County (Louisville) Circuit Court and lasted from October 18 to October 29, 1971.188
Daniel T. Taylor, III, is a well-known criminal and civil rights
lawyer in Kentucky. In a career spanning some 20 years he has
defended over 100 capital cases and numerous other serious criminal cases, often without pay. He is, to say the least, controversial
and has the unenviable distinction of being one of only two lawyers
in the country who appear to have suffered serious disciplinary
punishment for "misconduct" occurring in the trial of a single
case. 189 As we stated in our brief, his "reputation for vigorous, in185 1 was fortunate to have as co-counsel Doris Peterson and Morton Stavis of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, both of whom had been counsel in the Chicago 7
contempt
cases.
186
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-47 (1970).
187 418 U.S. at 490, quoting 494 S.W.2d at 739.
18sId. at 490.
189
See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1972); DISORDER
rNTHE COURT, supra note 15, at 160-62.
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novative, and effective advocacy was known to the trial judge, himself a former prosecutor.' 90 The trial judge, the prosecutor and
many members of the bar, however, would say that Taylor was a
disrespectful showman, who relied on antics and trickery to confuse
the jury or force a mistrial. However one viewed Taylor, there was
no question that he would vigorously defend his client with all the
means at his disposal and that in doing so he would not hesitate to
challenge the authority of the trial judge. The judge himself had
been an F.B.I. agent as well as a prosecutor, and even his most
ardent defenders would not deny that he was prosecution-minded.
He was also quick to assert his authority in court and, in our view,
was obsessed with the notion of "respect" due to him as "the
Court." 191 The legal community of Louisville assumed that the
Tinsley trial would produce a head-on confrontation between Taylor
the attorney and Hayes the trial judge, and indeed it did, as Taylor
v. Hayes bears witness.
The events leading up to the Tinsley trial set the stage for this
emotion-laden confrontation. The killings arose when two white
police officers wearing civilian clothes approached the Tinsleys in a
vacant lot while the brothers were talking with another black
youth, David Keith White. The officers demanded that the youths
produce identification, which Narvel refused to do, and an exchange of remarks, including a racial slur, followed between Narvel
and one officer. That officer then attempted to place Narvel under
arrest, at which point William Michael picked up the pistol that he
had dropped at the police's approach and fatally shot the officer.
The dispute at the trial would be over who killed the second police
officer. The resolution of the question was a matter of some import:
the death penalty was still in effect in Kentucky, and the prosecutor had publicly announced that he would seek this penalty
against both defendants.
Narvel's defense was that he fled as soon as the first officer
was shot and thus did not kill the remaining officer. The only witness to what occurred was David Keith White, the youth who was
with the Tinsleys at the time of the shooting. He gave the police
inconsistent versions of what happened, and one of his accounts
190Brief for Petitioner at 4, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).

His obsession with "respect" is revealed in the contempt citations themselves, five of which refer to Taylor's conduct as "disrespectful" or the like. The
judge also accused Taylor of not being able to learn "proper respect" for the court.
Joint Appendix at 62, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). The admonition of the
Supreme Court to the effect that judges must be on their guard against "conftsing
offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice,"
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958), is not infrequently honored more
in the breach than in the observance.
191
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incriminated Narvel. Narvel's defense clearly depended on destroying White's credibility, but if he were successful the jury would
necessarily have to conclude that William Michael killed both officers and would no doubt impose the death penalty. Narvel was
unwilling for obvious reasons to go this route or to try to persuade
the jury directly that William Michael killed the second officer.
Faced with the dilemma of creating this brother-against-brother
confrontation or seriously inhibiting his ability to present an effective defense, Taylor moved for a severance, which was denied by
the trial judge. This and other actions of the trial judge convinced
Taylor that the judge would do everything possible to secure
Narvel's conviction and the imposition of the death penalty on him.
The atmosphere maintained in the courtroom heightened the
probability of confrontation. The judge rigorously controlled all access to the courtroom and required all persons entering to submit
to a search. 1 92 The front rows of the seating section were apparently reserved for relatives of the slain officers, who understandably wept at frequent intervals. Numerous armed police officers,
both in uniform and plainclothes, were seated among the spectators. Moreover, even though there were often empty seats in the
lined up outside, trying uncourtroom, would-be spectators were
93
1
admission.
obtain
to
successfully
The Tinsey case was thus a "political trial" in the broadest
sense of the term: due in no small part to the demonstrated attitude of the trial judge, the defendants did not feel that they
would "get a fair shake."' 1 94 The "totality of the situation" as perceived by Taylor and his counsel was stated in our briefThe trial judge, realizing from the outset the weakness of the
prosecution's case against Narvel, and determined that in the final
tallying there would be "two black lives for two white ones," did
absolutely everything that he could to help the prosecution obtain a
conviction against Narvel and a verdict of death by electrocution. Beginning with his refusal to sever the trials, and concluding with his
effectively instructing the jury to find Narvel guilty of the shooting of
the second officer by directing a verdict in favor of Michael as to this
death, he tried in every way possible to interfere with the successfil
presentation of Narvel's defense, and to convey to the jury his firm
belief that Narvel was guilty of wilful murder and should be sentenced to death. In so doing he was hostile, sarcastic and threatening
toward the petitioner and did not attempt to hide his feelings toward
192

494 S.W.2d at 741.

193

Id.; Joint Appendix at 79. Taylor's challenge to the refusal to admit persons to
the courtroom was the partial basis for one of the contempt citations. 418 U.S. at
492-94
n.3.
1
9 See note 124 supra.
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the petitioner and his client from the jury. It was in the context of
this hotly-contested trial, accompanied by an evident drive by the
judge to bring about a conviction, that the petitioner was called upon
to represent and protect his client.' 95

And it was in this context that Taylor would be found guilty of
eight counts of criminal contempt.
B.

The Contempt Charges and the ProceedingsBefore

the TrialJudge
The voir dire lasted for three days, during which time Taylor
was held in contempt for "going over the same [forbidden] question" with a prospective juror. 19 6 A conference in chambers followed the citation, and the judge informed Taylor that he would
impose punishment later. 197 At the end of the conference, however, the judge rescinded the contempt citation and changed it to a
98
"warming."'
Two more of the contempt citations issued during the presentation of the prosecution's case.' 99 The judge did not specify what
the precise charges were on either count two or count three, and
he did not impose punishment on these-or on any other of the
charges-at the time of citation. 20 0 On count two, for example, the
judge told Taylor that he was holding him in contempt for "completely ignoring the court's ruling" with respect to evidence concerning Narvel Tinsley's escape from custody 20 1 and for "the antics
he's going through." 2 02 In the judge's chambers, Taylor was permitted to respond to these two charges for the record, but his responses were intermingled with a discussion of the substantive
issues in the case. 20 3
195 Brief for Petitioner at 6-7 (footnote omitted). The Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the directed verdict on behalf of Michael was not improper. Tinsley v.
Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Ky.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 (1973). Since
only Narvel and his brother were present at the time of the second shooting, the
directed verdict meant the jury would necessarily have to conclude that Narvel
killed the second officer.
196 494 S.W.2d at 739; Joint Appendix at 30.
197 Joint Appendix at 30.
198 Id.
at 37. However, when the judge imposed sentence at the conclusion of
the trial, he included the first count, forgetting that he had changed it to a warning.
Id. at 29. In the corrected judgment, he rescinded the sentence on that count. 418
U.S. at 490-91.
199 418 U.S. at 492-93 n.3 (counts two and three).
20 0

Id. at 497.

201 Joint Appendix at 42-64.

202 Id. at 42. While awaiting trial, Narvel Tinsley escaped, but he subsequently
gave himself up.
203 Id. These "antics" were not mentioned in the formal charges that the judge
subsequently filed. See 418 U.S. at 492 n.3 (count two).
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On count three, the judge stated that "[tlhe court.., is holding Mr. Taylor in contempt for the second time during this trial for
smarting off to the Court in Open Court. That's all I've got to
say." 2 4 As with the previous count, Taylor was given permission to
respond for the record and did so. The judge then said that he too
would respond for the record: his response consisted of criticizing
Taylor for leaving the courthouse as soon as the trial was over on
the previous day. After Taylor responded to this criticism, the discussion returned to the tone of voice Taylor had been using. It
then shifted to the judge's accusing Taylor of not following his orders. The judge next questioned whether Taylor was properly representing his client and accused him of not knowing how to show
respect to the court. Another colloquy followed, in the course of
which the prosecutor stated that in his opinion Taylor was trying
the case in the best interest of his client. This prompted the trial
judge to walk out of the room and to order the reporter to record
that fact. Matters concluded with Narvel Tinsley's being called in
and examined with respect to his representation by Taylor. 20 5
The remaining contempt charges issued during the presentation of the defense. On count four, the judge simply called the
attorneys into chambers and stated: "It's the order of the Court
again that Mr. Taylor is in contempt of Court." 206 There was then
some discussion about admissibility of evidence and the procedure
for making objections, but no discussion about the still-unspecified
contempt charge.20 7 In his chambers, the judge cited Taylor for the
fifth time when ruling that a witness whom Taylor had been examining would not be permitted to testify further. The judge demanded that Taylor produce a list of all other witnesses that he
intended to call for the defense and said that Taylor was "also in
contempt of Court for [his previous] actions in the Court," but he
did not specify what those actions were. 20 8 When Taylor asked
whether he could speak for the record, the judge responded that
he had 10 minutes to submit the witness list and said: "You can
209
speak to the record all you want to, sir."
204 Joint
20

Appendix at 56.

5 Id. at 55-68.

206 Id. at 69. The basis of this count was that Taylor was "disrespectful" to the
court and refused to take his seat at counsel's table as ordered. 418 U.S. at 493 n.3.
On remand, Taylor was convicted on this count.
207 Joint Appendix at 69-79.
208
Id. at 97. The basis of this count was that Taylor had purportedly disobeyed

the court's order in regard to asking questions about a press conference, and that he
had accused the court of disallowing the admittance of black persons in the courtroom. 418 U.S. at 493 n.3. In point of fact, neither part of the count %assupported by
the record, see Joint Appendix at 94-97, and on remand the count was dismissed in
its entirety.
209 Joint Appendix at 97.
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When Taylor produced the witness list, the judge summarily
ruled that nine of his 21 witnesses, all of whom had been properly
subpoenaed, would not be permitted to testify.
There were no conferences in chambers following the subsequent contempt citations. On count six, 2 10 the judge simply in-

formed Taylor that he was in contempt, and when Taylor asked to
respond for the record, the judge said that he could do so at the
next recess. 211 The record is silent with respect to anything more
on this charge. 212 On count seven, 213 the judge initially permitted
Taylor to respond, but then directed the court reporter not to include the response in the record, saying: "I'm not going to
even-don't even put this in the record. Mr. Taylor is not running
this Court, I am."-21 4 The judge specifically refused to let Taylor
make a response for the record on the eighth count,2 15 and on the
ninth count he simply informed Taylor that he was again in
contempt.216
Throughout the trial there was, in the words of the Supreme
Court, a "running controversy" between Taylor and the trial
judge. 217 During the voir dire the judge interrupted Taylor's examination of a prospective juror, stating that he was going to take
over the voir dire, and saying to Taylor: "I think you're putting on
a show. That's my opinion." 218 During a discussion in chambers
about wrangling between attorneys, he stated in reference to
Taylor: "I can't blame the guy too much for [talking] but . .. he is
getting away from the questions and knowing him, if you give him
an inch, he'll take a mile. I might as well sit on him now." 219 The
210 This count accused Taylor of reading parts of a witness's statement out of
context in violation of the court's order when questioning a police officer about the
statement. 418 U.S. at 493 n.3. The record shows that Taylor did not read from the
statement at all when questioning the officer. Joint Appendix at 105-06. This count
was dismissed on remand.
211 418 U.S. at 490 n.1; Joint Appendix at 107.
212 418 U.S. at 490 n.1.
213 The basis of this count was that Taylor "again referred to a press conference
that the court had previously ordered him not to go into," and that he had "waved
his arms at the witness in a derogatory manner indicating the witness was not truthful." 418 U.S. at 493 n.3. On remand it was dismissed in its entirety.
214 Joint Appendix at 109; see 418 U.S. at 490 n.1.
215 418 U.S. at 490 n.1. This count involved an incident arising out of a deputy
sheriff's statement that Taylor's aide had not been searched and Taylor's demand
that his aide be searched. Id. at 493-94 n.3. On remand, Taylor was convicted of this
count.
216 Joint Appendix at 119. The basis of this count was that
Taylor repeatedly
asked a witness a question that the court had ruled improper-it does not appear In
the record what that question was, see Joint Appendix at 117-19-and that Taylor
was "disrespectful" in referring to a police officer as "this nice police officer." 418
U.S. at 494 n.3. This count was dismissed in its entirety on remand.
217 418 U.S. at 501.
218 Joint Appendix at 31, quoted in 418 U.S. at 502.
219 Id.
at 40, quoted in 418 U.S. at 502.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

April 1976]

SUMMARY CONTEMPT

judge also questioned whether Taylor's purpose was in fact to defend his case 22 0 and accused him of trying to make every case a
political trial.2 21 At one point, when Taylor remarked that he had

five months of his life wrapped up in the case, the judge retorted:
"Before it's over, you might have a lot more than that."22 The
judge refused to explain the meaning of this statement.2 At the
same time, Taylor accused the judge of denying his client's right to
a public trial 2 2 and of acting on the basis of rancor in ruling that

race was not an issue in the case.2 5 He complained of the judge's
"overbearing contentiousness in regard to me, both by phrase and
. . . utterances," and asserted that the judge was prejudicing the
defendant's trial.2 26 And when Taylor made some reference to the
jury in arguing an evidentiary point, the judge accused Taylor of
implying that the judge had "rigged the jury."2 7 When Taylor replied that he had ified a motion challenging the composition of the
jury, the judge said: "I impaneled this jury. If it's rigged, I did
it.

228

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found both defendants
guilty and sentenced them to death. 229 At this time, the judge,
after calling into question Taylor's motives, ethics and legal
abilities, summarily found him guilty of nine counts of contempt
and imposed separate, consecutive sentences on each count, ranging from 30 days to one year in length and totaling four and onehalf years' imprisonment. 230 Taylor, given no opportunity to respond to the sentences or to the tirade preceding them,2" was
immediately placed in custody and taken to the Louisville city jail.
Because the trial judge refused to make himself available to
Taylor's local counsel for the purpose of setting bail, a bail hearing
had to be ordered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. At the hearing, Judge Hayes refused to allow Taylor to be present and denied
Id. at 61; 418 U.S. at 502.
Appendix at 82-83.
22Id. at 98, quoted in 418 U.S. at 502.
= Id.
220

221Joint

2

4

Id. at 79.

Id. at 82.
22'Id. at 60, quoted in 418 U.S. at 502.
7
2 Id. at 86.
Id.
229 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions but held that the
death sentences had to be reduced to life imprisonment. Tinsley v. Commonwealth,
495 S.W.2d 776, 783-84 (Ky.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 (1973).
20 Joint Appendix at 28-29. This rather one-sided exchange between the judge
and Taylor is set out in its entirety in the Supreme Court's opinion. 418 U.S. at
491-92 n.2. At one point, when Taylor attempted to respond to the accusations being
leveled against him, the judge threatened to have him gagged. Joint Appendix at 29,
quoted in 418 U.S. at 491-92 n.2.
231Joint Appendix at 28-29, quoted in 418 U.S. at 491-92 n.2.
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bail.2 32 Bail was finally ordered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
and Taylor was released. Shortly thereafter, the judge entered an
order prohibiting Taylor from practicing law in his court.2 3 3

C.

The Proceedings Before the Kentucky Court of Appeals

An appeal from the contempt conviction was seasonably taken
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the highest state court. 234 Before deciding the case, however, the court of appeals granted over
our objection a motion by the trial judge for permission to "correct
the judgment." In the "corrected judgment" the judge stated that
the first count of contempt should have been changed to a warning,
and he reduced the two one-year sentences he had previously imposed to six months each. 2 35 While he did not specifically state that
the sentences were to run consecutively-as he did when imposing
sentence from the bench-neither did he say that they were to run
concurrently.2 36 He also filed a "certificate of contempt," analogous
to that required under rule 42(a),23 7 setting out the contempt
charges.238
We raised five issues on the appeal-(1) that Taylor was entitled to a trial by jury on the contempt charges; (2) that Taylor was
denied due process because be was not given the opportunity to be
heard in defense or mitigation; (3) that the trial judge could not
impartially sit in judgment on the contempt charges, since he was
personally embroiled in controversy with Taylor; (4) that none of
the citations supported a conviction for criminal contempt; and (5)
that the trial judge did not have the power to bar an attorney from
practicing before the court over which be presided as punishment
for criminal contempt. The case was submitted on briefs, since the
Kentucky Court of Appeals only hears oral argument by special
permission, which was denied us.
Given what I perceived to be the Kentucky Court of Appeals's
concern over courtroom disruption, coupled with Taylor's reputa418 U.S. at 502.
418 U.S. at 497. The Kentucky Court of Appeals then held that the judge
lacked the power to impose such a ban. 494 S.W.2d at 747.
234 At the time there was no intermediate appellate court in Kentucky.
235 The judge specifically stated that the reduction was being made because he
did not have the power to impose a sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment
on a particular count in the absence of a jury. Joint Appendix at 27.
236 Id.
The court of appeals had previously seemed to hold that if a judgment
did not provide otherwise, multiple sentences would be construed to run consecutively. Beasley v. Wingo, 432 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Ky. 1968).
237 Rule 42(a) has no analogue in Kentucky practice, as the judge noted in his
certificate. Joint Appendix at 24.
232
233

238

Id. at 24-27.
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tion as a controversial lawyer, 2 39 I was not optimistic about getting
the contempt convictions set aside on any ground other than the

claim of the right to a jury trial. But in view of the widespread
availability of a jury trial in criminal proceedings under Kentucky

law, 240 I thought it unlikely that the court of appeals would be
willing to uphold the summary power of a trial judge to sentence a
lawyer (or anyone else) to a lengthy prison term. Moreover, while
Taylor was pending, the court of appeals held in another criminal
contempt case that under Kentucky law it was "clear that unless

the right is waived the trial court may not inflict a fine greater than
$500 or incarceration for more than six months except upon the

unanimous verdict of a jury .

as in comparable criminal

cases.""' And, as it indicated in Taylor, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals assumed that for jury trial purposes the sentences on sepa-

rate counts had to be aggregated, as they were in Seale.2, My
"nightmare" was that the court would somehow reduce the sentence to six months and reject all of our other attacks on the conviction.
29 When the Kentucky Court of Appeals imposed six months' suspension from
practice as discipline for Taylor's conduct in a 1968 murder trial, it stated:
It is common knowledge that in certain widely publicized trials of recent
years a new breed of lawyers has instituted the studied technique of baiting
the trial judge in order to convey to the public an impression that its courts
are instruments of discrimination and injustice. Frequent contempt citations
are the hallmark of that technique. It will not be tolerated in this jurisdiction.
The representation of unpopular clients or points of view does not clothe
the lawyer with a special immunity from his obligations as an officer of the
court....

Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 482 SAV.2d 574, 584 (Ky. 1972).
24 0
In all noncontempt criminal cases tried before the circuit court there is the
right to trial by jury irrespective of the maximum penalty that can be imposed. KY.
CONST. § 11. Prior to Taylor, the right to trial by jury was also generally provided for
by statute in the inferior courts. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 113 (1972);
KY. REV. STAT. § 432.260 (1975); note 241 infra.
241 Local 1667, UAW v. Kawneer Co., 490 S.W.2d 747, 748 (1973). As stated
above, in the noncontempt situation the right to trial by jury in the circuit court is
absolute. See note 240 supra. The Kentucky legislature had limited the punishment
that could be imposed for contempt by a witness to a maximum fine of S30 and a
maximum imprisonment of 24 hours, KY. REV. STAT. § 421.140 (1971), and had provided that for other direct contempts the maximum punishment that could be imposed without the intervention of a jury was $30 or 30 hours' imprisonment. KY.
REv. STAT. § 432.260 (1975). In Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971), the
court of appeals invalidated the provisions of § 421.140 under the Kentucky constitution, finding it to "materially interfere with the administration of justice." 462
S.W.2d at 948. In Taylor we tried to distinguish § 432.260 on the ground that it limited only the punishment that could be imposed without a jury, not the punishment
that could ultimately be imposed. The court of appeals, however, was of the view
that this was a "distinction without a difference" and invalidated the limitations
contained in § 432.260 as well. 494 S.W.2d at 745.
242 494 S.W.2d at 746-47.
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This nightmare became a reality. The court of appeals did hold
that the total sentence summarily imposed on Taylor could not exceed six months,2 43 but, noting that the corrected judgment did
not direct otherwise, it went on to hold that the sentences were to
be served concurrently.2 44 Since the aggregate sentence thus mod-

ified did not exceed six months, the claim of entitlement to a jury
245

trial was denied.
The court of appeals did not specifically discuss our argument
that Taylor was entitled to a "minimum due process" hearing before finally being adjudged guilty of the contempt charges. It
merely noted that the judge's actions at the end of the trial could
not have surprised Taylor, "because upon each occasion and immediately following the charged act of contempt the court [had]
informed Taylor that he was at that time in contempt of court." 246
The court of appeals surmounted the embroilment issue by emphasizing that at no time had Taylor made a personal attack on the
judge:2 47 the judge's strong remarks at the time of adjudication and
sentencing were described as "more akin to a declaration of a
charge against Taylor based upon the judge's observations [than] a
constitutionally disqualifying prejudgment of guilt."2 48 The court

felt that the judge's language, although "inappropriate," did not require his disqualification "in the light of the obvious guilt of
Taylor. -249
The court omitted discussion of the specific contempt charges
and ignored our argument that Taylor had not actually committed
criminal contempt for on no count was an actual and material obstruction of the administration of justice shown to exist. 250 Instead,
it accused Taylor of "embark[ing] upon a plan or program designed
to disrupt the trial and by any means possible cause the trial court
'25 1
to commit trial errors which might form the basis of an appeal."
Finding that Taylor's actions had "place[d] on trial the entire judicial system of [the] Commonwealth," the court simply concluded
that, "[i]n the light of the entire record," Taylor was guilty of each

charge. 252

at 747.
Id. The court also reversed the disbarment order. Id.; see text accompanying
note 233 supra.
243 Id.
244

245

494 S.W.2d at 747.

Id. at 742. This occurred only in the context of its discussion of the embroilment issue. See id. at 741-42.
246

Id. at 741.
Id. at 744.
249 Id. at 745.
250 See note 164 supra.
251 494 S.W.2d at 740.
247
248

252

Id.

at 741. The court also noted that our belief "demonistrate[d]

something
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Before the Supreme Court

1. The Issues on Certiorari
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari was limited to three
"procedural" issues raised in our petition--entitlement to a jury
trial, the right to a hearing and disqualification of an embroiled
judge. 2 3 On the same day that our petition was granted, the Court
also granted certiorari in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania254 on the issues
of whether sentences imposed for separate contempts must be
aggregated for jury trial purposes and whether a jury trial is required in any case when "a substantial term of imprisonment" is
25 5
imposed.
The grant of certiorari in Taylor, coupled with the grant of
certiorari in Codispoti, indicated to me that the Supreme Court
was contemplating "giving plenary consideration to the constitutional requirements applicable to the disposition of criminal contempt cases."2 5 6 As I prepared our brief on the issues of the right
to a hearing and the embroilment of the trial judge, I could not
escape the feeling that the arguments I was making were also arguments against the existence of the summary contempt power itself. If a right to notice and opportunity to be heard existed, and if
embroilment of a particular judge mandated his disqualification,
then it would seem only reasonable to require that every hearing
be before another judge, because trial judges are necessarily involved in the events leading up to contempt charges. The requirement of a "neutral and detached" judge, announced by the Court
in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,257 had recognized that "institutional bias" was sufficient to disqualify a judge,2 8 and such bias
clearly seemed to be present in every exercise of the summary
contempt power. Furthermore, widespread abuse of the summary
contempt power had been empirically demonstrated in the study of
the Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct of the Association of
less than complete and total respect for the judicial system of (the] Commonwealth."
Id.
- 414 U.S. 1063 (1973). The Court denied our request to grant certiorari with
respect to the substantive question of "what conduct on the part of an attorney engaged in zealous representation of his client can be made punishable as criminal
contempt on the ground that it has created a material obstruction to the administration of justice." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 28.
- 414 U.S. 1063 (1973).
2 'sId.at 1063-64.
256 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 28.
-7 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 349-52 infra.
258 See id. at 60; text accompanying notes 330-33 infra. "Institutional bias" was
also the basis of the decision in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1955). discussed in text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
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the Bar of the City of New York, 2 59 and the Committee had
strongly recommended its complete abolition.2 60
In short, the time seemed propitious to revive the challenge to
the constitutionality of the summary contempt power itself, and
after careful consideration we decided to do so. 261 Recognizing that
this question had not been specifically raised in the petition for
certiorari, we suggested in our brief that the Court might wish to
consider whether summary punishment for contempt was violative
of due process of law.2 62 Although I was permitted to devote a
portion of the oral argument to this question, the Court made it
abundantly clear in the colloquy that it was not about to abolish the
summary contempt power, and it did not address the issue in its
opinion. Nevertheless, in deciding the issues presented in Taylor
and Codispoti, the Court did further limit the summary contempt
power, provoking Justice Rehnquist to protest that "the total absence of any basis in the Fourteenth Amendment for the result
which the Court reache[d]" was to him "clear beyond any
doubt. "263
2. The Right to a Jury Trial
Our contention that Taylor was entitled to a jury trial consisted of the following arguments, which were made in ascending
order-(1) Taylor was entitled to a jury trial in the circumstances of
the particular case; (2) contempt was a "serious" offense, and the
right to a jury trial should thus attach in all contempt prosecutions;
and (3) whenever an accused faces possible imprisonment for any
offense, he is charged with a "serious" offense within the meaning
of the trial-by-jury guaranty. 26 4 We first argued that the Court had
not adopted a "six-month rule" for determining the right to trial
by jury in cases of criminal contempt. 265 In a noncontempt situation, the Court had looked to the maximum penalty authorized by
statute as one of the "objective indications of the seriousness with
which society regards the offense," 26 6 but it had also held that a
particular offense might be considered sufficiently serious to justify
25 See DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 233-34; text accompanying
notes 161-62 supra.
260 DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 232-38.
261 There is always a temptation to try to make a case an important one, and, in
retrospect, I cannot be sure that the omens were as favorable as we thought, or,
perhaps more accurately, as we wanted to believe.
262 Brief for Petitioner at 47.
263 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 531 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
264 Brief for Petitioner at 13-15.
265

Id. at 19-23.

266

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
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a jury trial despite a relatively mild maximum penalty.2 6 7 In criminal contempt cases, the Court had looked to statutory penalties to
determine the seriousness of the offense, 2 8 and in their absence it
had considered the "severity of the penalty actually imposed as the
best indication of. . . seriousness."2 6 9 We argued, however, that
the Court had never held these to be the only relevant indications.2 7 0 Taylor, we contended, had been charged with quite a
serious offense: the four-and-one-half-year sentence originally imposed was certainly severe punishment, and both the trial judge
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals had characterized Taylor's conduct as being nothing short of despicable.2 7 1 Without agreeing ith
this characterization, we argued that it was utterly incongruous for
the court of appeals to portray Taylor's actions in this way and yet
maintain that he stood charged only wvith a "'petty offense" when he
asserted his right to jury trial.2 72 We further argued that Taylor
should have prevailed even if the Court were to adopt a six-month
rule, because the right to a jury trial should have attached at the
time the sentence was originally imposed and ought not to have
been defeated by subsequent modification of the sentence.2 7 3
In arguing the broader proposition that criminal contempt
should be considered a serious offense within the meaning of the
trial-by-jury guaranty, we relied on Supreme Court holdings that a
person cannot constitutionally be convicted for contempt unless his
conduct created an actual and material obstruction of the administration of justice. 2 74 This being so, we argued, contemptuous conduct was "likely to be regarded as contrary to the 'social and ethical judgments of the community,' in a society in which the fair and
orderly administration of justice is held in high regard" 27 5 and
should thus be considered to involve a serious offense entitling one
to a jury trial. 6 We also noted that the seriousness of a charge of
criminal contempt against a lawyer was magnified by its possible
27 In this respect I relied particularly on District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63 (1930), in which the Court held that the offense of "'driving recklessly as to endanger persons and property" was a serious offense within the meaning of the trialby-jury guaranty, although the maximum authorized punishment was a fine of $100

and 30 days' imprisonment Id. at 73-74.
268
269
270
271

See, e.g., Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969).
Brief for Petitioner at 22-23.
See 494 S.W.2d at 740-41; text accompanying note 251 supra. As to the trial

judge's characterization, see Joint Appendix at 28-29.

Brief for Petitioner at 24-26.
Id. at 28-29.
274 See Brief for Petitioner at 30; cases cited in note 164 supra.
275 Brief for Petitioner at 30-31, quoting District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617, 628 (1937).
276 Id. at 31, citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
272
273
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2 77
collateral consequences, such as bar disciplinary proceedings,
and we pointed out that since a contempt proceeding involves a
confrontation between the defendant and the court, represented by
the judge, the appearance of justice required that trial be before a

jury.

2 78

Our third level of argument, that the right to a jury trial
should attend every prosecution involving the possibility of imprisonment, was based on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 279 which established
an absolute right to the assistance of counsel whenever such a possibility exists. We argued that the different historical genealogy of
the right to trial by jury28 0 did not justify treating that right differently from the other guaranties of the sixth amendment: those
other guaranties were not contingent on the extent of possible imprisonment, and neither should the trial by jury guaranty be so
conditioned. 281
A majority of the Court, rejecting all these arguments, held
that since the sentence ultimately imposed on Taylor had not exceeded six months, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The Court
stated:
Petitioner contends that any charge of contempt of court, without exception, must be tried to a jury. Quite to the contrary, however, our cases hold that petty contempt like other petty criminal
offenses may be tried without a jury and that contempt of court is a
petty offense when the penalty actually imposed does not exceed six
months or a longer penalty has not been expressly authorized by
statute .... 282
277

See Edmunds v. Chang, 365 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D. Hawaii 1973), rev'd on

other grounds, 509 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 39 (1975). We did not
argue that there should be a different rule for attorneys and nonattorneys, but maintained only that because so many contempt cases do involve attorneys the collateral
consequences to an attorney should be taken into account in determining whether
criminal contempt was by its very nature a serious offense. See Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 23.
278 Brief for Petitioner at 31-33. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the
Court had stated:
Indeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can be made
for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise
of official power. Contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes
at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament. Even
when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the
judicial process or with the duties of officers of the court.
Id. at 202.
279 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
280 See id. at 30; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932).
281 Justice Black and Justice Douglas had previously taken the position that the
right to a jury trial applied to all "crimes" irrespective of the punishment authorized
or imposed. See text accompanying notes 95, 102 supra.
2 418 U.S. at 495.
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In so holding, the Court refused to accept our argument that the
right to a trial by jury irrevocably attaches at the time an original
sentence is imposed. The majority saw no difference between a
state's initial choice to impose a sentence no longer than six months
and a state's post-conviction decision to reduce a longer sentence
already imposed. In either case a jury trial might be legally
avoided, for "the State itself has determined that the contempt is
not so serious as to warrant more than a six-month sentence."U 3
Dissenting on this point, Justice Marshall saw the trial judge's
reduction of Taylor's sentence 284 as a "transparent effort to circumvent this Court's Sixth Amendment decisions and to save his summary conviction of petitioner without the necessity of airing the
charges before an impartial jury," 2 and he noted that it was
hardly coincidental that Taylor's sentence had been reduced to the
six-month maximum. 2 6 Likewise, he saw the majority's decision as
an "extraordinarily rigid and wooden application of the six-month
rule," which the Court had changed
from a reasonable effort to distinguish between "serious" and "petty"
contempts into an arbitrary barrier behind which judges who wish to
protect their summary contempt convictions without7 exposing their
charges to the harsh light of a jury may safely hide.28
In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,2 8s decided the same day as Taylor,
the Court held in a five-to-four decision that when a judge waits
until the end of the trial to impose sentences for separate contempts, the sentences must be aggregated in determining the
defendant's right to a jury trial. Thus, when the aggregate sentence
imposed exceeds six months, the right to trial by jury attaches.
However, the Court made it clear that if a judge imposes punishment at the time contempt is committed, he may impose any
number of six-month sentences without triggering this right. 2 88 In
the view of the majority, when a judge waits until the end of a trial
to punish for contempt, there is "no overriding necessity for instant
2 Id. at 496.
2m The actual

reduction was accomplished by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
which based its decision on the fact that the trial judge did not specify in his corrected judgment whether the sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently.
494 S.W.2d at 746.
418 U.S. at 504.
86
d.
7
28 Id. at 504-05.
25

2

-8 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 513-15. Justice Marshall, who joined a plurality of the Court in holding
that sentences must be aggregated if imposed after trial, also argued that the sixmonth limitation was equally applicable where the trial judge acted "on the spot."
Id. at 519 (concurring in part). The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Stewart and
Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 522, 523.
29

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:34

action to preserve order." 2 90 The majority further noted, as did the
Seventh Circuit in Seale, 29 1 that a trial judge acting after the fact
might tailor his choice of punishments and of acts to be punished
in such a way as to evade the necessity for a jury trial. To allow
this would pose "the very likelihood of arbitrary action that the
requirement of jury trial was intended to avoid or alleviate." 2 92 The
dissenters argued that prior to Codispoti the Court had never required a jury trial in the case of direct contempts, and felt in any
event that "[t]he determination of whether basically undisputed
contempt is a particularly inapfacts constitute a direct criminal
29 3
propriate task for [a] jury."
Taylor and Codispoti, taken together, thus constitute the
Court's latest pronouncement on the right to trial by jury in cases
of criminal contempt. When no maximum penalty for contempt is
provided by statute, the sentence actually imposed-even if it is
the result of a retroactive modification by the trial judge or reviewing court--determines whether the offense is a serious one for jury
trial purposes. And only if that sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment will the offense be a serious one. When multiple contempts have been committed, if the judge adjudicates and punishes
each contempt as it occurs, he can impose any number of consecutive six-month sentences, but if he waits until the trial is over, the
sentences must be aggregated for the purpose of applying the sixmonth rule. When the punishment for contempt is imprisonment,
then, the availability of the right to trial by jury now appears to be
definitively settled.294
290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 515.
See text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
418 U.S. at 515.
Id. at 523 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
In Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), Justice White, writing for the

Court, stated the law as follows:
(1) Like other minor crimes, "petty" contempts may be tried without a jury,
but contemnors in serious contempt cases in the federal system have a Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial; (2) criminal contempt, in and of itself and
without regard for the punishment imposed, is not a serious offense absent
legislative declaration to the contrary; (3) lacking legislative authorization of
more serious punishment, a sentence of as much as six months in prison, plus
normal periods of probation, may be imposed without a jury trial; (4) but
imprisonment for longer than six months is constitutionally impermissible unless the contemnor has been given the opportunity for a jury trial.
Id. at 475-76. In that case, the Court held that the imposition of a $10,000 fine on a
labor union was not "of such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever
right to jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 477. The Court
left open the question of whether the right to jury trial applied at all when a fine was
imposed against a labor union or a corporation.
Subsequently, in Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., No. 1429-67 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 3, 1976), the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia noted that a 85000 finu
imposed on an individual had "immensely greater" impact than it would if the con-
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3. Entitlement to a Hearing

The issue that might suddenly have become the most important and explosive aspect of our case was the right to be heard.

Even in Sacher, the Supreme Court had never been presented
with the precise issue of whether due process requires a trial
judge, in whose presence a contempt has been committed, to give
the contemnor some opportunity to be heard in defense or mitiga-

tion before he is summarily adjudged guilty and sentence is

imposed.2 9 5 We argued that even when the judge proceeds summarily, there must be a "minimal due process hearing": the judge
must separate discussion on the contempt charge from discussion
on other matters, state the precise nature of the charge, listen to

arguments in defense or mitigation and rule on guilt or innocence.
On this issue, we emphasized that Judge Hayes had never

specified the precise nature of the charges during the trial, 2 6 and

that whenever Taylor was allowed to respond, his statements were

intermingled with discussions of other aspects of the case and were
received strictly for the record, indicating that the judge had already made up his mind.2 9 7 Thus we asked that there be a point in
time removed from the rest of the trial when an accused be given

notice of the contempt charges and an opportunity to be heard. We
made it clear, however, that we were not seeking the same kind of
full-scale hearing required when the events giving rise to the
charge do not occur in the judge's presence.2 9 8 The necessity for a
minimal due process hearing, we argued, was not obviated by the
temnor were a large organization and found that a jury trial would be required under

such circumstances. Instead of remanding the case for trial, however, the court reduced the fine to $500, presumably transmogrifying the offense into a "petty- one.
In Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947
(1975), the defendant was charged with four criminal contempts, each of which was
punishable by statute by a maximum six months' imprisonment. He was convicted
on all four counts, but the total sentence imposed did not exceed six months. The
argument that the total authorized penalty under the statute in his case was 24
months, thus entitling him to a jury trial,
was rejected by the court. Citing Taylor, it
held that since the penalty actually imposed did not exceed six months, and since
the judge had the discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, there
was no right to a jury trial.
295 In Sacher the judge had given the right of allocution. See note 33 supra.
Notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard were not specifically required by
rule 42(a), and there were both federal and state cases indicating that summary
punishment for contempt could be imposed without any hearing whatsoever. E.g.,
United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1962); People v. Carr, 3 III. App.
3d 227, 229-30, 278 N.E.2d 839, 840 (1971).
296 See text accompanying notes 199-200 supra. The charges were first specified
in the "corrected judgment and certificate of contempL" Joint Appendix at 24-27.
297 See text accompanying note 201 supra. See generally Joint AppendLx at 30
passim.
298

See, e.g., FED. R. CRiMf. P. 42(b).
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fact that the conduct in question might occur in the judge's presence, since presumably no judge would be impervious to arguments that he perceived the facts inaccurately or was mistaken in
his view that the conduct constituted criminal contempt.2 9 9 While

carefully noting that it was only necessary on our facts to hold that
an accused be entitled to such a hearing when the judge waits until
after the trial to act, we urged that there be a right to a hearing
even when the judge acts immediately, since the utility of a hearing and the impact of a conviction are the same in both instances.
With only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, the Court ruled in our
favor on the hearing issue. Although it refused to expand its holding to include immediate exercises of the summary contempt
power, 300 the Court held that the minimal due process requirement of "reasonable notice of the specific charges and opportunity
to be heard" 30 1 must be satisfied whenever a judge delays his action until the end of a trial. In such circumstances, any denial of
the basic right to be heard in one's own defense could not be tolerated, for the "usual justification of necessity" would carry much less
weight. 30 2 The Court noted that the judge's own observations or
the trial transcript could be determinative of factual issues but
pointed out that the accused might argue "that the behavior at
issue was not contempt but the acceptable conduct of an attorney
representing his client" or that "he might present matters in mitigation or otherwise attempt to make amends with the court." 303
Because Taylor was admittedly not given even this minimal hearing at the end of the trial and before the imposition of sentence,
his contempt conviction was reversed and the case was remanded
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals for further proceedings.A04
4. Disqualificationof the TrialJudge
On the issue of recusal, we argued that under any test Judge
Hayes had clearly been embroiled in controversy with Taylor. Em299 That such arguments might well be effective is indicated by the frequent
appellate reversals, often on the merits, of summary contempt convictions. See text
accompanying notes 161-62 supra.
300 418 U.S. at 497, citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
301 The Court made it clear that this minimal requirement of due process was not
the same as the full-scale hearing required where the conduct did not occur in the
court's presence. Id. at 499, 500-01 n.9; see text accompanying note 298 supra.
302

418 U.S. at 497-98.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 500, 504. In Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth
Circuit also held that a minimal due process hearing was required when the judge
waited until the end of the trial to act. Id. at 984.
303
3 04
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phasizing the judge's statements and actions throughout the trial
and particularly at the time of final adjudication and sentencing, 0 5
we maintained that he had been an activist seeking combat, that he
had perceived himself as the victim of a personal attack, that he
had shown demonstrable bias against Taylor and finally that he had
adopted an adversary posture with respect to the alleged contemnor. 30 6 Here, too, we noted that the Court need not decide
whether the embroilment defense was available when the judge
acted on the spot, but we argued that it ought to be held to apply
equally to that situation, since "where [the judge] cannot impartially sit in judgement, the denial of due process is no less because
committed in the name of'preserving order.' "307
Again, the Court refused to extend its holding to immediate
exercises of the summary contempt power, but it held that Judge
Hayes, who had delayed his actions, was personally embroiled in
controversy with Taylor and was thus disqualified from proceeding
summarily and from trying Taylor on remand. To justify this holding, the Court took some pains to create a new category of embroilment that would disqualify a judge who was neither the unfortunate victim of a personal attack nor the sort of person that might
mount such an attack himself. Thus, although Judge Hayes had
clearly not been subjected to any personal attack as had been the
judge in Marbury, the Court did not find it necessary to consider
whether he was an activist seeking combat as was the judge in
Offutt. Instead, the Court focused on the judge's reactions to the
alleged contempts30 8 and concluded that his words and conduct
-set out at length in the opinion 3 9-- demonstrated that he had
become "embroiled in a running controversy" with Taylor. 3 10 In
this connection the opinion noted particularly that "as the trial
progressed, there was a mounting display of an unfavorable personal attitude toward petitioner, his ability and his motives, sufficiently so that the contempt issue should have been finally adjudicated by another judge." 31 1 In sum, the Court's treatment of the
embroilment issue indicates that whenever the record evidences a
material lack of impartiality, whatever its genesis or justification,
0o5
See text accompanying notes 230-31 supra.
306 See United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 84142 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Brief for Petitioner at 66.
308 418 U.S. at 503 n.10.
09
3 Id. at 491-92 n.2, 502.
310 Id. at 501.
3x1Id. at 501-02. The Court also relied on the judge's failure to provide a hearing
on the contempt charges as showing bias on his part, distinguishing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964), on that basis. 418 U.S. at 502-03.
307
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the trial judge-at least when he waits until the end of the trial to
act-cannot sit in judgment on contempt charges. 312
5. The Impact of Taylor v. Hayes on the Summary Contempt Power
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Taylor, felt that the Court's
opinion had indeed wrought significant changes in the summary
contempt power. He thought that the notion of a minimal due process hearing was "completely at odds with Sacher," 313 and he asserted that "procedures upheld within the unitary confines of the
federal court system only two decades ago [could not after Taylor]
be constitutionally employed by a State."3

14

The decision in

Taylor, he said, "will surely come as something of a shock to federal judges who must now decide whether they may constitutionally utilize the provisions of [rule 42(a)] in punishing direct
contempts." 315 Taylor does represent a departure from Sacher on
this score, but in no way does it preclude federal judges from using
the summary procedures set forth in rule 42(a). Taylor simply
means that federal judges, like their state court counterparts, will
have to proceed less summarily when they wait until the end of the
trial to punish for contempt: they will have to afford the minimal
due process hearing outlined in Taylor. Justice Rehnquist also argued that recognizing the defense of embroilment when the judge
was not a victim of a personal attack was a "total repudiation of the
principle laid down in Sacher."31 6 This is true, but, as indicated
312 When the case was remanded, the state, through Judge Hayes, elected not to
seek the imposition of a penalty in excess of six months' imprisonment. On retrial,
Judge Robert M. Spragens dismissed counts two, five, six, seven and nine but found
Taylor guilty on counts three, four and eight. As in the Chicago 7 remand, he imposed no punishment beyond the time already served and the payment of court
costs. Although we believed that a conviction could not be sustained on those counts
either, we decided- against appealing in view of the absence of any punishment.
In In re Karagozian, 44 Cal. App. 3d 516, 118 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1975), a virtual
replay of Taylor, an apparently embroiled judge waited until the end of trial to sentence the attorney and afforded him no notice or hearing. The only difference between that case and Taylor was that the judge took action while the jury was still
deliberating. The court of appeals, noting that at that time no justification for proceeding summarily existed, found Taylor controlling and reversed the convictions,
directing that the case be retired before another judge. For post-Taylor cases where
a proper hearing was afforded before an impartial judge, see Howell v. Jones, 516
F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 962 (1975). In In re Williams, 409 F.2d 949, 959 (2d Cir. 1975), the court
indicated that the trial judge probably was embroiled in controversy with the conternnor, but reversed the conviction on the ground that the conduct charged did not
on the record constitute criminal contempt.
313 418 U.S. at 525.
314

Id. at 527.

3

Id.

15

316

Id.

at 529. He distinguished Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), dis-
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earlier, 3 17 the foundation of Sacher's conservative embroilment
standard had long been eroded away. Taylor merely limits Sacher
to its precise holding that a federal judge may proceed summarily
under rule 42(a) even when he waits until the end of the trial to
act. 3 18 When he does attempt to proceed in this manner, however,
he is constrained-as is his state counterpart-by the guaranties of
procedural due process: he cannot try contempt charges when he is
personally embroiled in controversy with the accused.
Left unanswered by the decision in Taylor is whether the right

to a hearing obtains and the defense of embroilment is available
when a trial judge immediately exercises his power "for the purpose of maintaining order in the courtroom, to punish summarily
and without notice or hearing contemptuous conduct committed in

his presence and observed by him." 319 Proponents of the summary
contempt power will read Taylor as affirming exercise of the summary contempt power in this manner, while their opponents will
argue that the question has been left open. 320 Moreover, if the
Taylor Court is to be taken at its word, and the immediate exercise
of the summary contempt power is thus truly an exception to the
cussed in text accompanying notes 66-71 supra, on the ground that it involved the

Court's supervisory powers over the lower federal courts rather than a constitutional
question. 418 U.S. at 530.
317 See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
318 In Taylor, the Supreme Court encouraged judges to postpone hearing contempts:
Moreover, whatever justifications may sometimes necessitate immediate imposition of summary punishment during trial "to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an 'actual obstruction
of justice,' ... [r]easons for permitting straightway exercise of summary power
are not reasons for compelling or encouraging its immediate exercise."
418 U.S. at 500-01 n.9, quoting Codispoti v.Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513 (1974),
and Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1952) (citations omitted).
21 d. at 497. In United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975). the trial judge,
proceeding under rule 42(a), explained to the contemnors the protection accorded by
a grant of immunity and advised them that if they continued to refuse to testify he
would hold them in contempt. He also offered them an opportunity to speak in their
own behalf. Id. at 315-16, n.7.
32 0
In Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975), a post-Taylor case, the trial judge summarily imposed punishment each time the acts in question occurred, but he also gave the
defendant a minimal due process hearing in chambers each time. The court also
found that the judge was not embroiled. Id. at 132-33, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30. The
case demonstrates how a minimal due process hearing can be conducted during the
trial without substantial interference. In State cx rcl. Young v. Woodson, 522 P.2d
1035 (Okla. 1974), the court held that a minimal due process hearing was required
by the Oklahoma constitution when the judge punished during the course of the
trial. The ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial judge § 7.4 (Approved Draft 1972), which the Court cited in Taylor, 418 U.S. at 499 n.8. provide for
the right to a hearing whenever the judge acts to impose punishment for contempt.
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ordinarily "indispensable" right to a hearing,3 2 ' then it can be
forcefully argued that no exercise of that power without a hearing
or by an embroiled judge can be justified unless it is necessary for
the purpose of maintaining order. 322 Such an argument finds support in the long-recognized principle that the authority to punish
for contempt is limited to "the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed." 323 Indeed, pausing to hold a minimal due process
hearing during a trial would not seem greatly to impair a court's
ability to preserve order, nor would an embroiled judge's need to
maintain the dignity of his court seem to outweigh an alleged
contemnor's right to be tried by an impartial arbiter. Thus the
further argument might be made that the summary contempt
power, even when invoked to preserve order, should only be exercised after a minimal due process hearing held before an impartial
judge. Acceptance of this conclusion by the Supreme Court would
go a long way toward preventing the arbitrary and improper use of
the summary contempt power. 324
In the end, however, the questions of whether the right to a
hearing attends immediate exercises of the contempt power and of
whether an embroiled judge can act on the spot to punish contempts cannot be separated from the question of whether the exercise of the summary contempt power is itself unconstitutional. As
noted, the Taylor opinion specifically refused to consider the first
two questions, and it did not mention the last at all. Cogent arguments can be marshalled against the summary contempt power:
while the Supreme Court will doubtless have to face these arguments in the future, it is not too early to advance them now.

3f21

418 U.S. at 497-98 n.6, quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536

(1925).

322 Presumably the appellate court would have to make an independent determination of this fact. In light of United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975), discussed
in text accompanying note 61 supra, "maintaining order" would include preventing
obstruction of the proceedings.
323 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966). The principle was first
enunciated in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821) (legislative
contempt), and was reaffirmed in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
324 This conclusion apparently was reached in Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975). However,
in State v. Gonzalez, 134 N.J. Super. 472, 341 A.2d 694 (1975), a defendant who
uttered certain vulgarities while he was being sentenced immediately was held In
contempt and given a six-month sentence. When the defendant again directed similar remarks to the judge, the judge responded by imposing another six-month sentence. The contempt sentences ran consecutively, and were to be served before the
sentence on the underlying charge.
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VI
THE CASE AGAINST THE EXERCISE OF THE

SUMIARY CONTEMPT POWER

The essence of the case against the summary contempt power
is that any exercise of that power is inherently unfair to the accused, and that less unjust methods are available to preserve order
in the courtroom. The case is a strong one, for the authority to
punish summarily for contempt, even as it has been or might be
limited by the Supreme Court, will always be arbitrary and liable
to abuse. 32 But the denial of basic rights and the inevitable unfairness that attend summary proceedings are not usually disputed
by proponents of the summary contempt power. Instead, they
argue that the justification for the power-the need to maintain
order in the courtroom-outweighs these evils. In this section I
will attempt to show that this proposition is seriously infirm and
that the summary contempt power therefore ought to be abolished
altogether. First, I will examine the inherent unfairness in the exercise of the power, for although (or perhaps because) the point is
frequently conceded, one is apt to forget how pernicious summary
contempt proceedings actually are. Second, I will argue that the
summary contempt power is not in fact justifiable, both because
the need for harsh weapons to preserve order in the courts is
greatly exaggerated and because less objectionable but equally efficient alternatives are available.
As has been observed: "[tihe power of a judge to inflict
punishment for criminal contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law." 32 6 That the existence of this

power is not merely anomalous but embarrassing and somewhat
shameful to our legal system was perhaps best expressed by Justice
Black:
When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury
and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge he is obviously incapable of
holding the scales of justice perfectly fair and true and reflecting im-

partially on the guilt or innocence of the accused. He truly becomes
the judge of his own cause. The defendant charged with criminal
contempt is thus denied what I had always thought to be an indispensable element of due process of law-an objective, scrupulously
impartial tribunal to determine whether he is guilty or innocent of
the charges filed against him .... "ro this end no man can be a judge

325Ex

parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309 (1888).

32 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome .... Fair trials are too important a part of
our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the
charges they prefer." . .327
The exercise of the summary contempt power is most clearly a
situation "in which an official .
occupies two practically and
seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial,
[and which] necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the
trial of defendants."' 32 8 Try as he may, no judge can divorce his
role as "the court" against which the purported contempt was
committed from his position as the adjudicator of the contempt
charge. This point was recognized in Sacher:
It is almost inevitable that any contempt of a court committed in the
presence of the judge during a trial will be an offense against his
dignity and authority. At a trial the court is so much the judge and
the judge so much the court that the two terms are used interchangeably in countless opinions in this Court and generally in the
literature of the law, and contempt of the one is contempt of the
other

....

329

Of course, the Sacher Court refused to disqualify "inevitably offended" trial judges from hearing the contempt charges, even if
they waited until the end of the trial to act. This approach has
been changed, as Taylor makes clear, but the fact that a particular
judge embroiled in controversy may now be disqualified does not
alter the validity of what was said in Sacher: any contempt of court
committed in the presence of the judge will be treated as an offense against him personally.
In noncontempt situations, it is not necessary to show a
judge's personal involvement in order to establish a violation of due
process: if the circumstances indicate that "institutional bias" is
present in the person of the judge, he will be disqualified. This is
illustrated most clearly by the Supreme Court's decisions in Ward
v. City of Monroeville330 and Tumey v. Ohio.331
In Turney, the Court found that a trial before a mayor of a
municipality violated due process because the mayor personally received income from the fees and costs levied by him against convicted violators. The mayor-judge in Tumey may thus be likened to
a judge personally embroiled in controversy, since both have a per327 Id.
at 199, quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1955) (footnote
omitted).
3 28
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927).
329 343 U.S. at 12.
330 409 U.S. 57 (1972).

331

273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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sonal stake in finding the accused guilty. In Ward the mayor-judge
did not share in the fees and costs, but the Court found the absence of such a personal interest irrelevant to the denial of due
process:

The fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in the fees
and costs did not define the limits of the principle .... [TIhe test is
whether the mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused ..... Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist when
the mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make
him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the
mayor's court....332
By the same token, the fact that a judge is charged with maintaining order in the court over which he presides offers a "possible

temptation not to hold the balance nice, clear and true" between
the court and the accused. Indeed, every judge could be said to
have a real stake in the institution of his court-in its preservation,
power and dignity. Trial by the judge before whom an alleged contempt has been committed is thus inherently a denial of the right
to trial before an unbiased judge.
Given this built-in abridgment of due process, one might well
pause to ask whether the game is worth the candle in the first
instance: would it not be better to abolish the summary contempt
power and simply suffer whatever courtroom disorder might follow? In its exhaustive study of the contempt power,3' the Special
Committee on Courtroom Conduct of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York found, contrary to popular belief, that courtroom disorder was not a significant problem in American courts. '
On the other hand, abuse of the summary contempt power was
found to be serious.3 35 These findings suggest that the problem of
courtroom disorder, and the need to remedy it, cannot really justify so dangerous a response as that of summary contempt.
This point need not be pressed, however, because the case
against the summary power does not have to focus on weighing the
justification of preserving courtroom order against the evils of the
summary contempt power. As evidenced by Justice Jackson's opinion in Sacher,336 the proponents of the summary contempt power
409 U.S. at 60, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

'1

3 DISORDER IN THE COURT,

4

supra note 15.

Id. at 6, discussed in text accompanying notes 154-60 supra.
.13
Id. at 232-38, discussed in text accompanying notes 161-63 supra.
336 [Tlhe very practical reasons which have led every system of law to vest a
3
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contend that, despite its inherent unfairness, the power is necessary
to enable judges to preserve order and is thus constitutional. It
would logically follow that if order in the courtroom could be preserved just as effectively by means less objectionable than the exercise of the summary contempt power, then the exercise of the
power would be violative of due process of law. Drawing an analogy to the approach taken to governmental interference with
fundamental rights and to governmental classifications that are
inherently invidious, 33 7 it may be asked whether the presumably
"compelling" governmental interest in preserving order in the
courtroom cannot be achieved by means other than the exercise of
the summary contempt power. Interestingly enough, this lessdrastic-means test has been applied to the exercise of the contempt
power in general, for the Court has held that the authority to
punish for contempt is limited to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 338 All of this lends impetus to the
proposition that if the summary contempt power cannot be shown
to be clearly necessary to prevent courtroom disruption, its exercise should be held violative of due process of law, or at least prohibited as a matter of policy. 33 9
When the summary contempt power is not exercised until the
trial has concluded, no basis whatsoever exists for invoking the
necessity justification. It is undoubtedly fairer for the judge to
delay his action until after trial, when the accused enjoys the right
to a minimal due process hearing and can raise the defense of embroilment. It is but a short step to extend the requirement to a
full-scale hearing before another judge. 3 40 More significantly, if the
summary contempt power is not immediately exercised to maintain
order in the face of contemptuous acts, the justification for allowing
contempt power in one who presides over judicial proceedings are also tie

reasons which account for it being made summary. Our criminal processes are
adversary in nature and rely upon the self-interest of the litigants and counsel
for full and adequate development of their respective cases. The nature of the
proceedings presupposes, or at least stimulates, zeal in the opposing lawyers.
But their strife can pervert as well as aid the judicial process unless ItIs
supervised and controlled by a neutral judge representing the overriding social interest in impartial justice and with power to curb both adversaries....
343 U.S. at 8.
37 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3-8Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966).
33" The Supreme Court could set such a policy for the federal courts by abolishing rule 42(a) and providing for trial before another judge under the present rule
42(b). State appellate courts could accomplish the same result if they had similar
rulemaking authority. As to action by the states and other recommendations for limiting the summary contempt power, see the discussion in DISORDER IN THE COURT,
supra note 15, at 236-38.
340 This was the argument we advanced to bring the issue within the grant of
certiorari in Taylor. Brief for Petitioner at 47.
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its exercise at all disappears. As Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in
Sacher, observed:
Summary punishment of contempt is concededly an exception to
the requirements of Due Process. Necessity must bound its limits. In
this case the course of events to the very end of the trial shows that
summary measures were not necessary to enable the trial to go on.
Departure from established judicial practice, which makes it unfitting
for a judge who is personally involved to sit in his own case, was
341
therefore unwarranted ....
Although Justice Frankfurter was referring to the embroiled judge,
the same rationale would apply to any judge who proceeded summarily after the trial, if institutional bias does indeed inhere in a
judge trying contempts allegedly committed in his presence. In
Taylor, the Court noted that "[t]he usual justification of necessity is
not nearly so cogent when final adjudication and sentence are postponed until after trial." 342 In fact, it is utterly absent at that time.
Thus for the judge to proceed summarily (or more accurately after
Taylor, "semi-summarily") when the trial has been concluded
should be considered a violation of due process of law. Present
practice need only be changed to require that trial be before
another judge, whether or not the trial judge was embroiled, and
that there be a full-scale--rather than minimal due processhearing.
The argument that strikes at the heart of the summary contempt power, however, is that the justification of necessity is untenable even when the accused is cited and punished on the spot
in order to prevent alleged courtroom disruption. This argument
has great force because the summary contempt power is simply not
necessary to prevent such disruption. Apart from the fact that no
serious quantitative problem of disruption plagues American
courts, 34 3 there are numerous methods available to deal with disruption when it does occur, and these methods do not involve the
inherent unfairness of the exercise of the summary contempt
power. A judge can control the disruptive defendant by using any
of the weapons in his "arsenal of authority" that the Supreme
Court set forth in Allen v. Illinois.3a4 Among these weapons is the
power to remove the defendant from the courtroom, or to hold him
in civil contempt by discontinuing the trial and imprisoning him
until he agrees to cease the misconduct. 34 5 With respect to
343 U.S. at 36.
418 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted).
34 See text accompanying notes 154-60 supra.
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
3a5
Id. at 343-44. As the Disorder in the Court study indicates, most of the prob341

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 513,4

lawyers, a citation for contempt, carrying the assurance of subsequent trial and the likelihood of bar disciplinary proceeding upon
conviction, would surely seem to be a sufficient deterrent for all
but the most persistently obstructive. The deterrent effect of a pos-

sible criminal conviction on contemptuous conduct will be no less
because the determination of guilt and punishment will occur in a
nonsummary proceeding before another judge.3 46 In the exceedingly rare instances when a lawyer embarks on a course of persistent obstruction, summary punishment for contempt, even if imposed on the spot, will probably not alter or deter the lawyer's
behavior. And once such severely disruptive conduct has occurred,
it would doubtless be inadvisable to continue the trial. The judge
ought to declare a mistrial, cite the offending lawyer for contempt
and rely on subsequent conviction and bar disciplinary proceedings
to prevent a recurrence. 347 In sum, the exercise of the summary
contempt power is simply not necessary to preserve order in the

courtroom,3 48 and the experience with its abuse should have persuaded the Supreme Court to put an end to this "anomaly in the

law. "349
lems of courtroom disruption occur in ordinary felony prosecutions as a result of
actions by the defendants. DISORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 90-105.
34 As Justice Frankfurter observed in Sacher:
the administration of justice and courts as its instruments are vindicated, and
lawyers who might be tempted to try similar tactics are amply deterred, by
the assurance that punishment will be certain and severe regardless of the
tribunal that imposes it.
343 U.S. at 37 (dissenting opinion).
347This point was made by the Louisville Bar Association in its amicus curine
brief filed in Taylor. Brief of the Louisville Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petition for Certiorari at 32-33.
348The absence of any necessity for the exercise of the summary contempt
power is further demonstrated by the fact that administrative agencies have long
been denied the contempt power, see ICC v.Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), yet do
not appear to have had any appreciable difficulty in conducting their proceedings.
Nor does the absence of the contempt power in civil law countries, see note 9 siupra,
appear to have created any major problems with maintaining order. See GOLDFARI,
supra note 9, at 2.
349Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). As the
Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct concluded:
The power of a trial judge to punish contumaceous behavior in his courtroom by summary process is of long vintage, has been approved by the
United States Supreme Court, and has been justified widely as a necessary weapon in the judicial arsenal. Nevertheless, we do not think it should
be perpetuated. It was recognized early that any procedure that permits a
single judge to exact criminal punishment without notice of charges or an
opportunity of the defendant to be heard is "arbitrary in its nature and liable
to abuse." ...

After reconsidering the justification and effect of summary contempt, we
have concluded that it performs no essential role in controlling misbehavior,
that alternative means are available to assure order in the court-including
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But, at least to this point, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to abolish the power. Perhaps it is persuaded that there will be
cases where the exercise of the summary contempt power, particularly during a trial, will make a difference. Or perhaps it believes
that the mere existence of the summary contempt power
deters improper conduct in the courtroom and that this deterrent
effect would be eviscerated if the trial judge were limited to citing
for contempt. And perhaps it is not unfair to say that what may be
involved is a bit of judicial conceit-the notion that judges, despite
the fact that they are performing otherwise inconsistent functions
and are necessarily involved in the events leading up to the charge,
can "hold the balance nice, clear and true" between the court and
the accused. 350 In any event, the exercise of the summary contempt power itself, subject to the significant limitations that the
Supreme Court has imposed, remains for the time being fully constitutional.
VII
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have attempted to analyze the development of
the summary contempt power and the limitations imposed on its
exercise by the Supreme Court. Today, this power can be exercised only where all the events giving rise to the charge occurred
in the courtroom and were personally witnessed by the judge. In
addition, the right to a jury trial prohibits the trial judge from
summarily imposing sentences in excess of six months' imprisonment for any one charge, and it requires that the aggregate summary sentence on all charges not exceed six months when the
judge waits until the end of the trial to act. Likewise, at least when
he does not act instantly, a judge must hold a minimal due process
hearing, affording reasonable notice of the charges and the opportunity to argue in defense or mitigation. Finally, when a judge delays his action, he will be disqualified from trying the charges if he
has allowed himself to become personally embroiled in controversy
with the accused. The effect of these limitations has been to make
the exercise of the summary contempt power somewhat "less
the civil contempt power-and that the arbitrary power it affords trial judges

should be terminated. Courtroom misbehavior should be subject to punishment only after notice and fair hearing before a judge other than the one who
presided during the incident giving rise to the contempt citation.
DIsORDER IN THE COURT, supra note 15, at 232, quoting Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289, 312 (1888) (citations omitted).
350 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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summary," and hopefully to impose safeguards against its arbitrary
exercise. The answer to whether these limitations will "virtually
emasculate this historic power of the trial judge," as Justice Rehnquist contends, 35 ' must await future development. But there can
be no doubt that this "historic power" has indeed undergone significant change.
There is still, however, a judicial unwillingness to abandon the
summary contempt power entirely, and for this reason I have also
set forth the case against it. When we are further removed from
the myth of the disruptive defendant and the contemptuous
lawyer, perhaps the utility of the power's continued existence will
be reconsidered. In Bloom v. Illinois,3' 2 the Court, breaking with
long-standing precedent to hold that the right to trial by jury applied to cases of criminal contempt, stated:
We cannot say that the need to further respect for judges and
courts is entitled to more consideration than the interest of the individual not to be subjected to serious criminal punishment without
the benefit of all the procedural protections worked out carefully over
the years and deemed fundamental to our system of justice. Genuine
respect, which alone can lend true dignity to our judicial establishment, will be engendered, not by the fear of unlimited authority, but
by the firm administration of the law through those institutionalized
procedures which have been worked out over the centuries. 35a
Perhaps the Court will someday recognize that the summary contempt power itself is totally repugnant to those self-same,
centuries-old, "institutionalized procedures." Until that time, however, the power will stand out as a stigma on the face of a judicial
system that purports to administer justice impartially.
351

Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (dissenting opinion).

352 391 U.S. 194 (1968).

35 Id. at 208.
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